# National Pandemic Preparedness and Response Plan

Republic of Maldives









#### Formulated and compiled by:

Health Protection Agency, Ministry of Health, Republic of Maldives, in collaboration with World Health Organization.

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Endorsed by:

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Permanent Secretary Ministry of Health Republic of Maldives 15 August 2022

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# Foreword by the Minister of Health




History and published research show that pandemics and large-scale disease outbreaks have always resulted in cumulative loss of lives, disruption of societies and devastation of world wide economies. Additionally, pandemics (regardless of its severity and scale) are proven to adversely impact large proportions of the population (particularly low to middle-income families and vulnerable groups). Furthermore, published records indicate that countries were only able to recover from pandemics or large-scale disease outbreaks by implementing genuinely multisectoral responses with no interruptions, spanning several months, sometimes even years. This has been the Maldivian experience as we still continue to deal with the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic even today.

The overarching objectives of pandemic planning is to minimize the impact of diseases on the life and health of communities. It is to enable and assist societies to function with minimal disruptions during a pandemic.

These plans also help societies to mitigate social and economic consequences of pandemics at both individual or family levels and on the country.

Accordingly, during the development of this "Pandemic Preparedness and Response Plan", special focus was given to align the plan with the National Health Master Plan 2016-2025, and to put emphasis on a whole-of-government and whole-of-society approach to ensure effective multisectoral collaboration. This plan was developed after multiple consultations with relevant stakeholders responsible for "planning, preparedness and response" to ensure that the needs of communities affected by health emergencies are properly represented and addressed amidst a pandemic.

This plan reflects lessons learnt and experiences gained from past influenza outbreaks as well as the on-going COVID-19 pandemic. Pandemic Preparedness and Response Plan aided Mal-



dives to achieve exemplary and historic levels of multisectoral collaboration and allowed the government to partner closely with the private sector and civil society. Hence, with Covid-19 still raging around the world, and still impacting many countries, it is important to continuously update these plans with the latest findings and globally-used strategies.

Global institutions have begun their research into the long-term effects of Covid-19, therapeutic and other interventions, including any possible adverse effects of mass vaccinations. However, the impacts have not yet been fully studied or understood and the results of these research projects have not yet been fully realized or published. Therefore, it is important to include strategies and interventions related to such possible eventualities in pandemic planning.

The plan also incorporates strategies and lessons learnt from other countries that has been adapted to the local context of Maldives and the experiences of covidl 9 responses that proved

useful. These strategies have already been adopted to improve the emergency management cycles in the Maldives.

I am confident that this plan will provide technical and practical guidance for all levels and types of health emergencies, including pandemics, and will serve as a ready reference when effective planning and timely responses are required.

The Ministry of Health remains committed to providing necessary support, guidance and coordination required in implementing the Pandemic Preparedness & Response Plan to ensure sustained resilience of health systems and communities during health and national emergencies. It is universally agreed that proper planning and preparedness is what guarantees the health and well-being of communities and economies.

#### **Ahmed Naseem**

Minister of Health



# Foreword by the WHO Representative




The National Pandemic Preparedness and Response plan is a framework for action, which sets out the whole-of-government measures to be taken to prepare for and respond to a pandemic. It updates the Maldives National Influenza Pandemic Preparedness Plan of 2017.

This document covers the preparedness and response plan for novel acute respiratory infections with pandemic potential (e.g. influenza or SARS) and recommends appropriate public health measures and response actions to be taken up before and during a pandemic. This plan can be applied to any acute respiratory pathogen (virus or bacteria) and guidance will be provided by MOH and WHO for individual novel pathogens where necessary.

Pandemics have occurred throughout history and many scientists believe that it is only a matter of time before another one occurs. Pandemics can vary in severity from something that seems simply like a bad flu season to an especially severe, worldwide influenza epidemic that could lead to high levels of illness, death, social disruption, and economic loss. It is impossible to predict when the next pandemic will occur.

This version of the updated Pandemic Preparedness and Response Plan outlines a series of actions that can readily be adapted and applied to any pandemic, irrespective of the nature of the virus and its severity, based on the lessons learned from the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic.



Moving forward, WHO will continue to engage experts and relevant partners to ensure preparedness planning efforts are collaborative, integrative, and aligned with current scientific research. Our collective task must be to better mobilize and deploy these resources to reduce the risk of future pandemics, and the human and economic damage they bring. This will require whole-of-government and whole-of- society responsibilities, not only those of health authorities and medical communty.

WHO Maldives is privileged to have supported the development and updating of this Pandemic Preparedness Plan, which leverages on the broad research portfolio, long-standing expertise in product development, capacity to engage both domestic and international partners, and flexible infrastructure to support its mission to respond rapidly to emerging and re-emerging infectious disease threats.

Dr. Nazneen Anwar

WHO Representative to Maldives

### **Contents**

| Foreword by the Minister of Health  | 1  |
|---|----|
| Foreword by the WHO Representative  | 3  |
| Contents  | 5  |
| Acronyms and Abbreviations  | 6  |
| PART A: SETTING THE SCENE   | 7  |
| Introduction —  |    |
| Pandemics —   | 9  |
| Maldives pandemic framework   | 14 |
| Public Health Emergency Alert levels in a pandemic ————————————————————————————————————         | 17 |
| Pandemic Planning and Response Strategy   | 19 |
| Ethical issues to consider in pandemic preparedness and response planning                       | 21 |
| Coordination arrangements nationally and locally  | 22 |
| Whole-of-government response work streams   | 25 |
| PART B: THE ACTION PLAN   | 28 |
| Standby Phase: Preparedness (local alert level 1: WHITE)  | 29 |
| Prevent Entry Phase: Border management (local alert level 1: WHITE)                             | 37 |
| Prevent spread phase: Containment (local alert level 2-3:YELLOW-ORANGE)                         | 51 |
| Respond to Surge phase: Pandemic management (local alert level 4: RED)                          | 63 |
| Ease and Resurgence Phase: Post-peak transition (local alert level 3: ORANGE)                   | 73 |
| Recovery Phase: Recovery management (local alert level 2: YELLOW)                               | 81 |
| PART C: SUPPORTIVE RESOURCES  | 85 |
| Contact persons for pandemic response in the health sector ———————————————————————————————————— | 86 |
| Workflow in responding to a suspected case: COVID-19 pandemic EOC                               | 87 |
| Forms and Templates: COVID-19 response  | 89 |

#### **Acronyms and Abbreviations**

AG Attorney General

CERT Community Emergency Response Teams
CMAT Clinical Management Advisory Team

CSO Civil Society Organizations

DGPH Director General of Public Health

DMSC Disaster Management Steering Committee

EoC Emergency Operation Center

HECC Health Emergency Coordination Committee

HEOC Health Emergency Operations Center
HEOP Health Emergency Operations Plan

HPA Health Protection Agency
ICS Incident Command System

IHR International Health Regulations 2005

LGA Local government Authority
MAC Multi-Agency Coordination
MNDF Maldives National Defence Force

MoE Ministry of Education

MoED Ministry of Economic Development

MoEn Ministry of Environment
MoF Ministry of Finance
MoFA Ministry of Foreign Affairs

MoFMRA Ministy of Fisheries Marine Resources and Agricualture

MoGFSS Ministry of Gender Family and Social Services

MoH Ministry of Health
MoT Ministry of Tourism
MPS Maldives Police Service
MRC Maldivian Red Crescent

NDMA National Disaster Management Authority
NDMC National Disaster Management Council
NERF National Emergency Response Force
NEOC National Emergency Operations Center
NEOP National Emergency Operations Plan

PHE Public Health Emergency

PHEIC Public Health Emergency of International Concern

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PPRP Pandemic Preparedness and Response Plan

TAC Technical Advisory Committee

UN United Nations

WHO World Health Organization




# Introduction

The pandemic preparedness and response plan (PPRP) is based on an established strategy to deal with epidemics of infectious diseases of international significance, and forms part of the National Health Emergency Operations Plan (HEOP) and intersects with the National Emergency Operations Plan (NEOP). The aim of pandemic preparedness is to minimize deaths, serious illness and serious disruption to communities and economy arising from a pandemic.

The purpose of this document is to outline the all-of-government and all-of-society measures that will be considered in response to a pandemic and provides an overarching framework for possible actions during a pandemic. It is intended for anyone involved in planning, preparation or response to a pandemic both locally and internationally. It provides an overview of the activities that are and needs to be undertaken to ensure the country is adequately prepared for a pandemic. It acts as a guide for individual agencies that need to make their own response plans and standard operating procedures which provide information in addition to that contained in this document. The document is set out in three parts. The first part provides the context to pandemics in general and national mechanisms. The second is the action plan based on the pandemic phases and the third, provides some templates and workflows adopted in the country during the COVID-19 pandemic.







## **Pandemics**

A pandemic is the spread of a disease across regions and or worldwide. Influenza is the most common disease with pandemic potential. A pandemic occurs when a new virus emerges and spreads around the world, and most people do not have immunity. Diseases of pandemic potential in the past have presented itself as a contagious disease of the respiratory tract. A pandemic entail not only the emergence of a new viral subtype, but also the capacity of that virus to spread efficiently from person to person and cause significant human illness. Viruses that have caused past pandemics typically originated from animal viruses and most recently corona virus.

To date, new influenza A virus subtypes and corona viruses have raised pandemic alerts with WHO declaring a public health emergency of international concern (PHEIC). In addition to influenza and corona viruses, PHEIC was raised for Ebola virus disease outbreak in 2014. Three of these spread throughout the world within a year of being clinically recognized and were declared pandemics by WHO.








1918 - 1919

1957 - 1958

1968 - 1969








2009 - 2010

2012 - 2013

2019 - 2020

WHO describes evolution of a pandemic in phases though four stages1. WHO announce the onset of each phase based on international evidence from the WHO Pandemic Taskforce and international consultation.

Figure 1: Global pandemic phases 2



Interpandemic phase: This is the period between influenza pandemics.

Alert phase: This is the phase when influenza caused by a new subtype has been identified in humans. Increased vigilance and careful risk assessment, at local, national and global levels, are characteristic of this phase. If the risk assessments indicate that the new virus is not developing into a pandemic strain, a de-escalation of activities towards those in the interpandemic phase may occur.

Pandemic phase: This is the period of global spread of human influenza caused by a new subtype based on global surveillance. Movement between the interpandemic, alert and pandemic phases may occur quickly or gradually as indicated by the global risk assessment, principally based on virological, epidemiological and clinical data.

Transition phase3: As the assessed global risk reduces, de-escalation of global actions may occur, and reduction in response activities or movement towards recovery actions by countries may be appropriate, according to their own risk assessments.

- 1. https://www.who.int/influenza/resources/documents/pandemic\_phase\_descriptions\_and\_actionspdf
- 2. https://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/handle/10665/259893/WHO-WHE-IHM-GIP-2017.1-eng. pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y Pandemic influenza risk management May 2017.
- 3. Previously classified as post-peak and post pandemic periods

It is important to note that the global phases and their application in risk management are distinct from the determination by WHO of a PHEIC under the IHR (2005); and the declaration of a pandemic based on assessment of the risk associated with the emerging biological risk.

Previously pandemic phases4 were classified as period and further broken down into phases that describe the risk associated with an influenza virus. This classification is also useful for national authorities to plan the response, hence described briefly here.

#### Interpandemic period,

In Phase 1, even though such viruses might theoretically develop into pandemic viruses, no viruses circulating among animals have been reported to cause infections in humans.

In Phase 25 an animal virus circulating among domesticated or wild animals is known to have caused infection in humans and is therefore considered a potential pandemic threat.

#### Pandemic Alert period

In Phase 3, an animal or human-animal re-assortant virus has caused sporadic cases or small clusters of disease in people, but has not resulted in human-to-human transmission sufficient to sustain community-level outbreaks. Limited human-to-human transmission may occur under some circumstances, for example, when there is close contact between an infected person and an unprotected caregiver. However, limited transmission under such restricted circumstances does not indicate that the virus has gained the level of transmissibility among humans necessary to cause a pandemic.

**Phase 4** is characterized by verified human-to-human transmission of an animal or human- animal re-assortant virus able to cause "community-level outbreaks." The ability to cause sustained disease outbreaks in a community marks a significant upwards shift in the risk for a pandemic. Any country that suspects or has verified such an event should urgently consult with WHO so that the situation can be jointly assessed and a decision made by the affected country if implementation of a rapid pandemic containment operation is warranted. Phase 4 indicates a significant increase in risk of a pandemic but does not necessarily mean that a pandemic is a forgone conclusion.

**Phase 5** is characterized by human-to-human spread of the virus into at least two countries in one WHO region. While most countries will not be affected at this stage, the declaration of Phase 5 is a strong signal that a pandemic is imminent and that the time to finalize the organization, communication, and implementation of the planned mitigation measures is short.

- 4. https://www.who.int/influenza/resources/documents/pandemic\_phase\_descriptions\_and\_acti ons.pdf
- 5. The distinction between phase 1 and phase 2 is based on the risk of human infection or disease resulting from circulating strains in animals. The distinction would be based on various factors and their relative importance according to current scientific knowledge. Factors may include: pathogenicity in animals and humans; occurrence in domesticated animals and livestock or only in wildlife; whether the virus is enzootic or epizootic, geographically localised or widespread; other information from the viral genome; and/or other scientific information.
- 6. The distinction between phase 3, phase 4 and phase 5 is based on an assessment of the risk of a pandemic. Various factors and their relative importance according to current scientific knowledge may be considered. Factors may include rate of transmission; geographical location and spread; severity of illness, presence of genes from human strains (if derived from an animal strain); other information from the viral genome.; and/or other scientific information

#### Pandemic period

**Phase 6**, the pandemic phase, is characterized by community level outbreaks in at least one other country in a different WHO region in addition to the criteria defined in Phase 5. Designation of this phase will indicate that a global pandemic is underway.

#### Post peak period

During the post-peak period, pandemic disease levels in most countries with adequate surveillance will have dropped below peak observed levels. The post-peak period signifies that pandemic activity appears to be decreasing; however, it is uncertain if additional waves will occur, and countries will need to be prepared for a second wave.

Previous pandemics have been characterized by waves of activity spread over months. Once the level of disease activity drops, a critical communications task will be to balance this information with the possibility of another wave. Pandemic waves can be separated by months and an immediate "at-ease" signal may be premature.

#### Post pandemic period

In the post-pandemic period, disease activity will have returned to levels normally seen for seasonal diseases. It is expected that the pandemic virus will behave similar to diseases like seasonal influenza. At this stage, it is important to maintain surveillance and update pandemic preparedness and response plans accordingly. An intensive phase of recovery and evaluation may be required.

These phases are based on the scientific study of the past pandemics. The time between raising alert of a PHEIC by WHO and widespread outbreak may be quite short, and some phases might progress rapidly or be missed if the disease progression is rapid as was observed in the COVID-19 pandemic. Hence, it is important for countries to be prepared for it with detailed pandemic response plans.



The legislative frameworks relevant for the pandemic response include:



Public Health Act (07/2012)



Disaster Management Act (28/2015)



Armed Forces Act of (1/2008)



Police Act of August (5/2008) (28/2015)



Maldivian Red Crescent Act (7/2009)



Decentralization Act (7/2010) (28/2015)

Other planning and response frameworks relevant for the pandemic planning and response include:



Health Emergency Operations Plan (HEOP)



National Emergency Operations Plan (NEOP)



Minimum Standards for Relief in the Maldives, NDMA



Airports Disaster management Plans (GARD-Get Airports Ready for Disasters)



Mechanism of Incident command system (ICS) of HEOP and NEOP



Sectoral emergency preparedness and business continuity plans



Pandemic planning and preparedness

HEOP identifies the emergency preparedness entities, structures and tools for responding to a public health emergency. In addition, hospitals are required to have emergency response plans and operations plans to respond to mass casualties.

Pandemic preparedness adds extra dimension to emergency planning and needs comprehensive planning, with total commitment from the government and local councils and other state bodies and civil society particularly for looking out for each other. Planning and preparedness for an event of the scale, scope, complexity and potential impact of a pandemic requires expertise from a range of fields. While the Ministry of Health takes a lead role in planning for a health response, many aspects of the national response are beyond its scope and an all- of-government response is required.

An essential component of preparedness is the consistent monitoring and surveillance during the period between pandemics (the 'inter-pandemic' phase). HPA as the lead national agency for public health emergencies has the role to monitor over-

seas trends and analyze risks through its disease surveillance systems and participation in international surveillance mechanisms that allow for early detection of a virus of pandemic potential.

Although animal health sector is small in the country, HPA will take the lead to coordinate with the agriculture sector on animal health surveillance, These systems must be capable of tracking the progress of a pandemic following announcements by WHO. Information from the surveillance system will play a key role in guiding actions throughout all the phases of a pandemic.

Pandemic planning will follow the planning process outlined in the HEOP together with the involvement of NDMA to enable early linkages with the emergency structures of the NEOP as required based on the national risk assessments through the local and global pandemic phases.


#### Public Health Emergency Alert levels in a pandemic

The HEOP notes that Alert levels for a public health emergency can vary locally and nationally. In a pandemic situation, the following alert levels are somewhat different to the alert levels of a PHE set out in the HEOP, given the scale, impact and national coordination required for response. Alert levels can be declared sub-nationally for specific Islands or at national level. The transmission scenario at the subnational level is used to determine the alert levels nationally.

Figure 2: Island alert levels and triggers in a pandemic

| Level 1: White          | > | NO CASE<br>No suspected or confirmed case  |
|-------------------------|---|--|
| Level 2: Yellow         |   | SPORADIC CASES Suspected or confirmed cases, imported or locally acquired contained to a single cluster                        |
| Level 3: Orange         |   | CLUSTERS OF CASES Confirmed human to human transmission linked to chains of transmission                                       |
| Level 4: Red            |   | COMMUNITY TRANSMISSION Confirmed human to human transmission with cases not linked to chains of transmission                   |
| De-escalation:<br>Green |   | CONSISTENT DECLINE IN TRANSMISSION  Consistent decline in the disease transmission as determined by epidemiological parameters |

Figure 2: Island alert levels and triggers in a pandemic



The onus to develop the criteria for a declaration of a Public Health Emergency (PHE) in the country mandate to HPA. When the Director General of Public Health (DGPH), based on the national risk assessment, concludes that there is a situation requiring the declaration of state of public health emergency, DGPH accordingly advises the Minister of Health. By legislation (07/2012), if DGPH advice as such, the Minister of Health must declare a State of PHE. The PHE may be declared for a specific geographic area for a specific period of time. With the declaration of a PHE, DGPH is entrusted with significant powers regarding public health matters.

#### Pandemic Planning and Response Strategy

The strategy is to work towards the goals of the pandemic preparedness. These are to:

Minimize the impact of the disease on life and health of the resident population. Enable the society to function as much as possible during the pandemic. Mitigate the economic consequences of the pandemic on the country.

To achieve these goals pandemic preparedness strategy is set out in 6 phases.

Table 1: Pandemic planning phases and strategic objectives

| Phase   | Strategic focus        | Potential trigger  | Specific objectives  |
|---|------------------------|--|--|
| Stand by<br>(local alert level<br>1: WHITE)                         | Preparedness           | Level of viral infections of pandemic potential verified to have caused animal-human but not sustained human-human transmission (Global Interpandemic phase & alert phase) | Functioning emergency structures and mechanisms  Timely alerts of diseases of pandemic potential and risk assessments.  IHR core capacities in place       |
| Prevent Entry<br>(local alert level<br>1: WHITE)                    | Border<br>management   | Sustained human-to- human transmission of a disease of pandemic potential in one or more countries (Global alert phase)  | Prevent and delay the entry of the pandemic virus in the country; Suspected case notification system in place Public empowered for prevention              |
| Prevent spread<br>(local alert level<br>2-3: YELLOW-<br>ORANGE)     | Containment            | Novel pandemic virus case(s)<br>detected in the country;<br>contained clusters<br>(Global pandemic phase)  | Contain the disease to the cluster or to the island Relief and protection provided IPC practiced at institutions and households                            |
| Respond to surge<br>(local alert level<br>4: RED)                   | Pandemic<br>management | Multiple clusters at separate locations increasing, or community transmission (Global pandemic phase)  | Minimize mortality and morbidity<br>Relief and protection provided<br>Maintain societal functioning to<br>provide for basic needs and other<br>emergencies |
| Plan for ease and<br>resurgence<br>(local alert level<br>3: ORANGE) | Post-Peak transition   | Population protected by vaccination, or pandemic receding (Transition phase)   | Funds and other resources<br>mobilized Return to near normal<br>society<br>Social and economic recovery<br>started   |

# Ethical issues to consider in pandemic preparedness and response planning

Decisions and policies within pandemic planning have ethical aspects. These include;





Priority of access to healthcare, medicines and medical resources with increased demand and possible shortages





Obligations of healthcare workers with regard to risks to their own health





The fine balance between reducing disease spread through isolation and travel measures whilst protecting the right of individuals to freedom of movement





Priority for shelter, relief and social protection, particularly vulnerable populations such as persons with disabilities, migrant workers, children, elderly and women





The adoption of languages and communication tools to reach all segments of the population.

# In good decision-making processes 7 the ethical principles to consider are to be:



Open: by letting others know what is to be decided, how and on what basis and what will come next.




Inclusive: including those who will be affected, population groups and striving for tolerance.



Reasonable: willingness to discuss alternative options and different ways of thinking and using fair process and shared values for decision making and enabling others to contribute.



Responsible: use of available and emerging evidence and using local evidence and knowledge, being responsible to others for our decisions and actions and helping others to be responsible.



# Coordination arrangements nationally and locally


A pandemic will potentially affect the whole of society and requires all-of-government coordination and decision-making. Strategic decisions will need to be taken to protect and reduce the impact of the pandemic on the country as a whole. National mechanisms must be established to mobilize and dedicate resources (financial, material and human) as the pandemic escalates. All agencies must expect that as the emergency escalates business as usual will be affected and business continuity contingency mechanisms will need to be activated. In such an event, strategic decisions will be made centrally through the national structures set out in the HEOP and if activated those set out in the NEOP.

National coordination will be led by the Ministry of Health at the early phases of the pandemic alert and Incident Command Systems (ICS) as set out in the HEOP. Based on the national risk assessment, Minister of Health may submit to the National Disaster Management Council (NDMC) to activate national disaster management structures. The coordination mechanism will be escalated to the ICS of NEOP upon the decision by the NDMC and based on the risk assessment at different stages of the pandemic, NDMC may decide to deescalate the response coordination to HEOP framework.

In the event when national disaster management structures of NEOP are not activated, operational decisions will be guided by the Health Emergency Coordination Committee (HECC) which includes the national IHR committee. In this situation strategic decisions may be made by a High Level National Taskforce chaired by the President. Such a taskforce, constituted by the cabinet ministers and heads of core institutions involved in the MAC group, was established in the COVID19 pandemic.


International partners, including UN Maldives are expected to engage with HEOC in the event of a pandemic for coordination of technical, humanitarian and financial support. WHO Maldives is the lead resident agency designated to lead the UN Maldives response and is part of HECC, providing technical guidance and mobilizing and coordinating resources to support gaps in government pandemic response in collaboration with Ministry of Health.

Figure 4: Public Health Emergency Coordination Framework in the event national disaster management structures are not activated (adapted from HEOP based on the COVI-19 pandemic operations)



The incident command systems will adopt the tools, mechanisms and structures as set out for the coordination in the HEOP or NEOP if NDMC decides to activate national disaster management structures. The transition from HEOP to NEOP and back to HEOP must be well coordinated based on the decision by NDMC after considering the recommendations of national risk assessment and an understanding of the uncertainties of the progression of the pandemic and shared expectations of possible need to plug in support with estimated resurgence post-surge.

Figure 5: National Emergency Response Coordination Framework (as proposed in NEOP)



#### Whole-of-government response work streams

Direction, control and coordination of work streams is guided by the HECC (HEOP) (or Disaster management steering committee if NDMC takes ad decision to activate NEOP structures), TAC and the incident command. Essential to the whole-of-government approach is planning and coordination supported by situational awareness. As such planning must be established as a work stream that consolidates and guides the operations workstreams. The responsibilities of planning workstream include:





Analysis and research on pandemic internationally and locallydemand and possible shortages





Develop national forecasts and produce technical and strategic decisions in consultation with TAC and HECC respectively





Develop national resource requirements and coordinate nationally and internationally to mobilize the sources.





Multi agency coordination including guidance for business continuity.





Maintain national and disaggregated data and information on technical and operational aspects of the pandemic.





Present strategic policy options to national task force and coordinate implementation of endorsed decisions.





Coordinate with other work streams and support planning and coordination of resource mobilization and response

The workstreams can be broadly categorized into Planning and coordination; Border management; Surveillance and situational analysis; Preparedness and control operations; and communications and awareness. To operationalize these workstreams, clusters for pandemic response at the EOC should include, but not limited to the following listed below. The cluster may be plugged in or plugged out based on the response needs. Figure 5 provides the framework for operational clusters during pandemic phase. In addition, economic and social protection workstreams will need to be activated in tandem with the operations.

#### 1. Public health surveillance and situation analysis

- 1. Case verification, surveillance, and contact tracing
- 2. Rapid response teams (RRTs)
- 3. Legal approvals and documentation
- 4. Guidelines, SOP development and quality assurance
- 5. Laboratory services
- 6. Biosecurity (based on the nature of the agent of pandemic potential)
- 7. Epidemiological analysis and research

#### 2. Border management (sea and air)

- 1. International Border health
- 2. Travel and tourism
- 3. International health communications (IHR related)

#### 3. Planning and coordination

- 1. Information management, technology and cyber security
- 2. Multi-agency coordination
- 3. Shelter and relief (including for foreign migrants)
- 4. Social support and welfare (with special emphasis on vulnerable groups PWDs, drug addicts, domestic and international migrants)
- 5. International coordination of aid liaison
- 6. Infrastructure sourcing and development
- 7. Finance sourcing and management
- 8. Human resources including volunteer mobilization
- 9. Lockdown management
- 10. Economy and economic welfare
- 11. Essential services continuity and security (food, utilities, healthcare, education, rehabilitation)

#### 4. Preparedness and Control Operations

- 1. Atoll coordination
- 2. Law and order and movement control
- 3. Logistics management including suspect & case movements and supplies
- 4. Operations support administration, procurement and stock management
- 5. HEOC security
- 6. Training of front line and health care workers
- 7. Medicines and medical supplies procurement and management
- 8. Quarantine and isolation facilities management
- 9. Care and health monitoring (home isolated cases and contacts, high risk and migrants)
- 10. Medical care facilities management
- 11. Mobile medical response
- 12. Mental health and psychosocial support
- 13. Quality assurance of health services
- 14. Inspections and compliance monitoring

#### 5. Risk communications

- 1. Call center (HPA hotline)
- 2. Press liaison
- 3. Spokesperson
- 4. Communications strategy and rollout



The action plan sets out the key actions for each phase of the pandemic planning and response strategy. As the plan takes a whole of government approach a specific lead agency is not identifiable in a number of actions.

The phases may be skipped or converge at a rapid pace with the pandemic progression internationally and nationally. Progression from one phase to the next will be informed by analysis of evidence and a detailed risk assessment discussed at operational levels and with the approval from strategic levels.

#### Standby Phase: Preparedness (local alert level 1: WHITE)

**Trigger:** National risk assessment recommendation based on the level of viral infections of pandemic potential verified to have caused anima-human but not sustained human-human transmission in any country or determination of a Public Health Emergency of International Concern (PHEIC) by WHO (corresponds to the Global Interpandemic phase and/or Alert phase)

**Strategy:** Functioning emergency structures and mechanisms; Timely alerts of diseases of pandemic potential and risk assessments; IHR core capacities in place

# Function Planning and coordination

| Action  | Responsible agencies  | Target  |
|---|---|---|
| Update business continuity plans of all institutions with operational readiness for pandemic response   | All institutions and industries   | Up-to-date business continuity plans that include operation readiness plans for all sectors and industries available on the agency websites |
| Develop and implement action plans for the sector to address lessons learned in response to the COVID19 pandemic.                                 | All institutions and industries   | All institutions have business continuity strategy for a pandemic available on the agency websites  |
| Develop IHR core capacities based on the latest IHR core capacity assessment (only selected IHR core capacity actions are specified in this plan) | Ministry of Health, Health Protection<br>Agency   | IHR core capacities in place and status report published on MoH website   |
| Maintain sector-specific guidelines and protocols for planning, response and communications.  | All institutions and industries   | All sectors have SOPs for response and communications available for staff   |
| Establish, revise and exercise pandemic plans locally and nationally.   | Ministry of Health supported by all institutions and industries   | Exercise scenarios developed for each phase of the pandemic   |
| Maintain sector-specific guidelines and protocols for planning, response and communications.  | All institutions and industries   | All sectors have SOPs for response and communications available for staff   |
| Maintain a legal framework for pandemic interventions, update to address lessons learnt from COVID19 pandemic.                                    | Ministry of Health, AG Office and President's Office  | Regulations are gazetted, updated and available on the agency website   |
| Maintain a communication plan and resources for alerting emergency coordination structures at HEOP, NEOP and local levels.                        | Ministry of Health supported by<br>National Disaster Management<br>Authority, Local Government<br>Authority and Maldives Red Crescent | HEOP and NEOP activation SOPs in place and available for responsible staff  |
| Train staff and conduct exercises/drills on agency and intersectoral response plans.  | Ministry of Health supported by all institutions and industries   | One exercise/drill conducted annually and report available  |

| Action   | Responsible agencies   | Target  |
|--|--|---|
| Have a designated space to activate HEOC at short notice, with communication and other resources should circumstances change.  | Ministry of Health supported by<br>National Disaster management<br>Authority   | HEOC command center set up in place at Ministry of Health   |
| Ensure workplace guidelines are up-to-<br>date and in line with latest WHO guideline<br>for diseases of pandemic potential and<br>available to all agencies.   | Ministry of Health   | Workplace guidelines up-<br>to-date and available on the<br>agency website  |
| Maintain communication resources for disseminating public information (including for persons with disabilities, migrants), risk assessment and disease management tools (case definitions, notification protocols) and information for other sectors.  | Ministry of Health, Health<br>Protection Agency supported by<br>MRC, President office, Media and<br>CSOs   | Risk communication unit<br>established at HPA with<br>staff and communication<br>management resources   |
| Develop a list of commodities and amounts to maintain a minimum stockpile of critical pandemic supplies (e.g., PPE, sample collection and transport materials, test kits, antivirals and antibiotics)  | Ministry of Health and health care facilities  | Minimum stockpile maintained at Central and Atoll stores and stock updates up-to-date   |
| Conduct a mapping of national human resources for pandemic response and maintain and up to date record   | Ministry of Health and health care facilities  | Human resource mapping for pandemic response available and current.   |
| Maintain plan and mechanism for contingency staffing and role-shifting of healthcare providers   | Ministry of Health and health care facilities, health professionals' bodies, CSOs in health  | Contingency plan for staffing<br>and areas for role-shifting of<br>healthcare workers available at<br>national and atoll level                |
| Maintain plan for provision of shelter, relief and emergency care at periods of movement restriction and curfews   | National Disaster Management Authority supported by Maldives Red Crescent, Ministry of Economic Development and Ministry of Gender Family and Social Services; Local government Authority and local councils, CSOs | Relief provisions plan upto-<br>date and available for national<br>and island level   |
| Institute mechanisms for migrant workers/<br>undocumented workers/tourists to<br>access testing/medical care/quarantine<br>or isolation facility stay or hospitalization<br>and food and basic needs for this duration<br>in a manner equitable to locals and that<br>does not hinder the public health goals of<br>prevention/containment | Ministry of Health and health<br>care facilities; local councils;<br>ministry of Tourism, Ministry of<br>Employment, CSOs  | Policy approved written SOP made available to relevant stakeholders   |
| Plan for law enforcement and maintaining law and order in periods of movement restrictions and curfew and monitoring compliance to quarantine and isolation  | Maldives Police Service; LGA and<br>local councils, Attorney General's<br>office; LGA; Prosecutor General's<br>office and Courts   | Law enforcement plan up-to-<br>date and available at police<br>services and nationally and<br>locally with clear roles for island<br>councils |
| Plan for social protection support for vulnerable population groups (persons with disabilities, elderly, migrants, women)  | Ministry of Gender Family and<br>Social services with support of<br>Local councils and CSOs  | Social support plan available nationally and at local councils  |

| Action   | Responsible agencies  | Target   |
|--|---|--|
| Maintain plan for provision of mental health psychosocial support including help lines and staffing to provide support to all islands  | Ministry of Health, Health<br>Protection Agency, Ministry<br>of Gender, Family and Social<br>Services, National Center for<br>Mental Health; MRC, and relevant<br>public and private sector, CSOs | MHPSS plan up-to-date with functioning help line (plan available on the agency website)  |
| Establish mechanisms to access a virus-<br>specific pandemic vaccine   | Ministry of Health, Health<br>Protection Agency, Maldives Food<br>and Drug Authority, Ministry of<br>Foreign Affairs and Ministry of<br>Finance,  | Written strategy and proposed mechanism available at MoH   |
| Plan for laboratory services (with designated public and private laboratories) and operational mechanism for obtaining test kits and samples transfer                                  | Ministry of Health and health care facilities   | Procedure for designating laboratories and their activation agreements made with the labs (agreements available at MoH)                      |
| Invest in developing local gene sequencing laboratory capacity with training of microbiologists and virologists as a core IHR capacity   | Ministry of Health; Maldives<br>National University   | Laboratory with gene-<br>sequencing capacity<br>established and functional with<br>a trained local microbiologist/<br>virologist             |
| Identify locations for establishing assessment facilities (flu clinics, testing sites), and medical supplies delivery mechanisms and contingency storage facilities                    | Ministry of Health supported by State Trading Organisation  | Potential locations and facilities<br>for medical care and medical<br>supplies storage identified and<br>documentation available at<br>MoH   |
| Identify locations and plan for local quarantine and isolation facilities and movement of cases.   | Ministry of Health; Local councils,<br>National Disaster Management<br>Authority; HECC  | Potential locations and facilities for quarantine and community isolation identified and documentation available at MoH                      |
| Promote the uptake of inter-pandemic influenza vaccination and personal hygiene.   | Health Protection Agency  | Influenza vaccine uptake<br>monitored at HPA to achieve<br>80% among high-risk groups  |
| Plan to minimize the risk of animal influenza virus transmission from animals to humans and to rapidly detect transmission   | Ministry of Fisheries, Marine<br>Resource and Agriculture;<br>Ministry of Health  | Animal disease control plan<br>available at MoFMRA and IHR<br>core capacity for animal health<br>in place                                    |
| Establish animal health surveillance to enable assessment as IHR core capacity to enable risk assessment of animal or bird infection being the vector for pandemic virus transmission, | Ministry of Fisheries, Marine<br>Resource and Agriculture;<br>Ministry of Health  | Annual surveillance with regular and timely risk assessments by MoFMRA when a threat is identified internationally, informed through IHR/OIE |
| Assess animal response options and maintain response plans, proportional to the scope of the animal industry in the country  | Ministry of Fisheries, Marine<br>Resource and Agriculture   | Contingency plan for responding and managing infected animals in place at MoFMRA   |

| Action  | Responsible agencies                                      | Target   |
|---|---|--|
| Maintain communication plan to provide public advice on limiting the risk of transmission from animals.   | Ministry of Fisheries, Marine<br>Resource and Agriculture | Risk communication plan at<br>HPA includes risk of disease<br>transmission from animals<br>coordinated with MoFMRA |
| Update national and local multi-sectoral operations plans for domestic airports and seaports of industrial islands  | All institutions active in domestic sea and airports      | Pandemic response operations<br>SoPs available at all domestic<br>airports and seaports of<br>industrial islands   |
| Ensure appropriate workplace guidelines, protection and training for animal workers and exposed humans to reflect WHO guidelines and national laws and regulations. | Ministry of Fisheries, Marine<br>Resource and Agriculture | Workplace guidelines for animal farmers available on the agency's website  |
| Developing a research agenda should be one priority for the initial phase, which should be reviewed as phases continue  | Ministry of Health; Health<br>Protection Agency; MoFMRA   | Research agenda and priorities<br>for each phase determined and<br>shared with stakeholders                        |
| Maintain a pandemic preparedness and response monitoring and evaluation framework focusing on outcome, output and process evaluation of the pandemic and response   | Ministry of Health; Health<br>Protection Agency; MoFMRA   | PPRP implementation<br>monitored annually and report<br>published on MoH website                                   |
| Identify a minimum set of indicators for each phase of the pandemic covering operational, health system, epidemiological and surveillance indicators                | Ministry of Health; Health<br>Protection Agency; MoFMRA   | Minimum data set updated along with the PPRP monitoring report annually  |



| Action  | Responsible agencies                      | Target  |
|---|---|---|
| Monitor the international disease situation through IHR mechanism.  | Health Protection Agency                  | WHO IHR information monitored weekly and updates included in the monthly and annual epidemiological reports available on the agency website |
| Maintain up to date baseline data from surveillance and conduct regular research and analysis   | Health Protection Agency;<br>Universities | Baseline surveillance data up-<br>to-date and current analyses<br>available   |
| Conduct national risk assessment including risks beyond health  | Health Protection Agency; HECC            | Risk assessments conducted on applicable situations and updated   |
| Develop criteria for declaring a Public Health<br>Emergency and its withdrawal and review<br>annually based on international guidance | Health Protection Agency; HECC            | Criteria for declaration and<br>withdrawal of public health<br>emergency written and available<br>on HPA website                            |

| Action  | Responsible agencies                                      | Target  |
|---|---|---|
| Test the disease surveillance systems to ensure they can identify a novel virus and a developing pandemic within the country following alerts from WHO. | Health Protection Agency                                  | Conduct exercises to test the capability of the surveillance system annually and report shared with the relevant agencies for corrective action   |
| Establish One Health surveillance by integrating human, animal health and community reporting mechanism using digital platform                          | Health Protection Agency                                  | Integrated One Health<br>Surveillance system established<br>and functional  |
| Maintain the capability, preparedness and training for early notification of suspected cases in resorts/industrial islands.                             | All institutions and industries                           | Conduct exercises to test the capability of disease notification and IPC in tourism sector and industrial islands annually and report shared with the relevant agencies for corrective action |
| Maintain animal surveillance as required.   | Ministry of Fisheries, Marine<br>Resource and Agriculture | Animal diseases surveillance conducted regularly and reported as required and annually on the agency website  |

# Function Border management

| Action  | Responsible agencies   | Target   |
|---|--|--|
| Update national and local multi-sectoral operations plans for all agencies active in border operations at each international port of entry (sea and air) with lessons from COVID19 pandemic | All institutions active in border operations at international sea and air ports                    | Updated border emergency plans with pandemic response operations actions at national and local levels available at agencies managing international air and sea ports |
| Incorporate traveler management operations at international airports and in the international airports and sea ports emergency response plan  | All institutions active in border operations at international sea and air ports and tourism sector | Border emergency plans<br>at all international airports<br>include traveler management<br>interventions  |
| Test and update plans nationally and at local levels to ensure stakeholders are aware of their responsibilities and roles irrespective of their location.                                   | Health Protection Agency   | One exercise conducted at each international port annually and report available  |
| Assess and audit IHR core capacity requirements regularly and improve as required.  | Health Protection Agency   | Annually assess IHR core capacity assessment and report available on the agency website  |
| Maintain the capability, preparedness and training to mount border control and cluster control operations when required.  | All institutions active in border operations at international sea and air ports                    | Conduct annual training for all institutions involved at border control  |

| Action   | Responsible agencies  | Target   |
|--|---|--|
| Maintain interconnectedness of border health and immigration information systems to enable tracking potential suspected cases                      | Health Protection Agency;<br>Maldives Immigration                           | Health declaration information linked with immigration information and annual analysis of public health risk made available on the agency website                |
| Ensure national IHR committee and local border emergency management groups meet regularly and update plans and procedures.                         | Health Protection Agency  | At least one meeting held annually and core capacities/ readiness updated and meeting reports available to stakeholders  |
| Conduct orientation for all agencies active in border operations on emerging public health threats as required based on international surveillance | Health Protection Agency  | Information sharing mechanism e.g. (online social network teams) in place to share emerging public health threats with HECC                                      |
| Review and maintain public health and infection control policies and procedures at the border.   | Health Protection Agency  | Up-to-date IPC procedures and public health requirements for international airport and sea port available on the agency websites of the respective lead agencies |
| maintain facilities for isolation/quarantine<br>with minimum standards set by HPA at all<br>international ports                                    | Maldives Ports and Maldives<br>Airports companies; Ministry of<br>Transport | Facilities designated and adapted to the minimum standards of HPA  |



| Action  | Responsible agencies   | Target  |
|---|--|---|
| Maintain the technical staff and information systems capability to assess risk, track and monitor the impact of a pandemic in order to inform action at different phases. | Health Protection Agency   | HPA has a dedicated staff<br>for surveillance of disease<br>of pandemic potential<br>epidemiological analysis<br>supported with data management<br>system       |
| Maintain the capability, preparedness and training to mount cluster control operations in resorts/industrial islands and inhabited islands when required.                 | Ministry of Health, Ministry of<br>Tourism, Ministry of Foreign<br>Affairs and other relevant<br>institutions and industries | Conduct exercises to test the capability for cluster control in tourism sector and industrial islands annually and report available at HPA                      |
| Maintain the functionality and increase capability of the outbreak information system (database) in order to facilitate HEOC operations as required                       | Ministry of Health, Health<br>Protection Agency, Presidents<br>Office; National Center for<br>Information Technology         | Outbreak system capability increased in order to use in other disease outbreaks in the interpandemic period   |
| Identify sources of additional staffing locally from health or non- health agencies, to enable an intensive cluster control operation to be sustained if required.        | Ministry of Health; and<br>Civil Service Commission;<br>Universities, schools, uniformed<br>bodies                           | Database of potential sources and<br>list of human resources that can be<br>mobilized for response compiled<br>and annually updated records<br>available at MoH |

| Action  | Responsible agencies  | Target  |
|---|---|---|
| Develop local training material and orientation package for new recruits to the system and contingency additional staff.  | Ministry of Health; Universities, health professions bodies     | Training package with core aspects of pandemic response in place and new recruits to the health care system oriented and training records available at MoH  |
| Review, update and exercise plans & conduct drills for HEOC/NEOC response   | Health Protection Agency  | HEOC/NEOC response exercise/<br>drills conducted and report<br>available and shared with<br>responders for improvement  |
| Prepare for an expansion in demand for key services including intensive care, primary care, ambulance services, laboratory services, helplines and other hospital services. | Ministry of Health and health care institutions                 | Database of potential sources<br>of resources identified for<br>beds, ambulances, vehicles<br>and boats, computers, phones<br>and annually updated records<br>available at MoH Sources of<br>mobilising |
| Plan for surge at Male' area and outer islands  | Ministry of Health and health care institutions; local councils | Surge plan written and reviewed regularly at national and local levels.   |



| Action  | Responsible agencies     | Target  |
|---|--------------------------|---|
| Maintain inter-agency reporting, communications and consultation, including ongoing liaison with WHO and regional networks  | Health Protection Agency | HPA has a dedicated staff to maintain risk communication and liaison with other agencies  |
| Build public awareness about diseases such as influenza and the potential for pandemic through routine media  | Health Protection Agency | Public awareness messages<br>are provided regularly and<br>messages available on HPA<br>website   |
| Reinforce health sector awareness and preparedness  | Ministry of Health       | Annually training on disease notification and IPC conducted for staff at healthcare facilities and training records available at HPA    |
| Conduct orientations for essential services to create awareness on pandemics, cluster control and business continuity planning  | Health Protection Agency | Annual orientation conducted for essential services and commodities (utilities, waste management, retail, education, social protection) |
| Reiterate core public health messages for pandemic disease prevention (e.g., the importance of hand- washing, and cough etiquette, well ventilated housing and work places) | Health Protection Agency | Public awareness messages are provided regular and messages available on HPA website  |

| Action  | Responsible agencies                                  | Target  |
|---|---|---|
| Maintain coordination with media for media planning and monitoring  | Ministry of Health                                    | A network with media is established and corporation areas written and shared with the network members |
| Maintained Risk Communication Strategy and implement as required.   | Health Protection Agency                              | Risk communication strategy<br>up- dated annually and shared<br>with all agencies and media<br>group  |
| If a new virus of pandemic potential is alerted by WHO, or there is a resurgence of an existing strain overseas, consider, as required: | Ministry of Health, Health<br>Protection Agency, HECC |   |
| informing key stakeholders (HECC, MAC<br>Group and Presidents office)   | Ministry of Health                                    | Procedure for informing written and available at HPA  |
| disseminating key messages (e.g., personal protection and preparedness, where to obtain current information(helplines, websites)        | Health Protection Agency                              | Key messages disseminated available on HPA website  |
| informing the public about what the authorities will do in a pandemic   | Health Protection Agency                              | Media statements available on<br>HPA website  |
| providing travel advice relevant to the threat  | Health Protection Agency                              | Technical information shared with HECC, MAC Group and health care sector and records available at HPA |
| reviewing and updating key messages and communication channels  | Health Protection Agency                              | Customized messages specific<br>to the threat agent available on<br>HPA website                       |
| coordinating communications across and within sectors   | Health Protection Agency                              | HECC and MAC Group convened<br>and minutes of meeting<br>recorded at HPA                              |
| creating web-based information sources,<br>such as frequently asked question sheets<br>and guides                                       | Health Protection Agency                              | Dedicated web-page created for the specific event   |
| initiating background briefings for key agencies and their spokespeople.  | Health Protection Agency                              | Multi-agency coordination<br>group activated and briefed<br>with minutes recorded at HPA              |

# Prevent Entry Phase: Border management (local alert level 1: WHITE)

**Trigger:** Novel pandemic virus case(s) not detected in the country, but national risk assessment recommendation based on the international sustained human-to-human transmission of a disease of pandemic potential in one or more countries or determination of a Public Health Emergency of International Concern (PHEIC) or declaration of a pandemic by WHO (corresponds to the Global Alert phase and/or Pandemic phase).

**Strategy:** Prevent and delay the entry of the pandemic virus in the country; Suspected case notification system in place; Public empowered for prevention and timely information provided on risks

#### Function Planning and coordination

| Action   | Responsible agencies  | Target  |
|--|---|---|
| Activate the Health Emergency Coordination<br>Committee (HECC/DMSC) and Health<br>Emergency Operations Center (HEOC) and its<br>work streams with the initial risk assessment<br>following alert by WHO of a public health<br>emergency of international health concern<br>(PHEIC) | Ministry of Health; Health<br>Protection Agency                 | HECC/DMSC activated within 24 hours of completion of risk assessment                    |
| Activate the Health Emergency Operations<br>Center (HEOC) based on the decisions of<br>HECC/DMSC   | Ministry of Health; Health<br>Protection Agency                 | HEOC activated within 24 h ours of decision by HECC/DMSC                                |
| Activate high level National Task Force (at President's office) for strategic decision making  | President's office  | National Task force<br>activated within 24 hours of<br>recommendation by HECC/<br>DMSC  |
| Activate emergency management structures;<br>Multi Agency Coordination (MAC) groups and<br>International Agencies/Aid Coordination   | Ministry of Health; HECC/DMSC                                   | MAC and International coordination activated within 24 hours of decision by HECC/DMSC   |
| Activate public health emergency contingency budget  | Ministry of Health; National<br>Task Force; Ministry of Finance | Emergency budget use<br>activated within 24 hours of<br>decision by National Task Force |
| Prepare to activate the National Emergency<br>Operations Center (NEOC) and its emergency<br>management structures when notified by<br>National Task Force  | National Disaster Management<br>Authority                       | NEOC stand by and activated<br>within 24 hours of decision by<br>National Task Force    |

| Action  | Responsible agencies  | Target   |
|---|---|--|
| Prepare to activate pandemic contingency/<br>business continuity plans at other sectors<br>and industries at short notice when<br>notified by the Ministry of Health.   | Ministry of Health, All institutions<br>and industries; EOC planning<br>workstream; MAC group         | pandemic contingency/<br>business continuity plans<br>activated within 48 hours of<br>notice by Ministry of Health   |
| Regularly report on the actual and anticipated impact of the pandemic and response activities in individual sectors and through the work streams and report on these activities to the HECC/DMSC.                     | Ministry of Health; EOC planning work stream  | Updates shared by HECC/DMSC at least weekly to a frequency determined by HECC/DMSC   |
| Monitor situation and make decision on declaration of a Public Health Emergency   | Health Protection Agency<br>(Director General of Public<br>Health); HECC/DMSC/National<br>Task Force  | Daily review of situation and if<br>DGPH concludes the issuance of<br>PHE, request Minister of Health<br>within 12 hours to declare PHE                          |
| Activate emergency management structures at health institutions as required (Hospital contingency plans and RRTs)   | Ministry of Health and healthcare institutions; EOC workstreams                                       | Health facility level RRTs and taskforce activated within 24 hours of decision by HECC/DMSC  |
| Activate designated laboratories for testing samples of suspected cases and link with operations information management system  | Ministry of Health; EOC planning work stream  | Designated laboratories activated within 24 hours of decision by HECC/DMSC   |
| Coordinate with private health care providers to on the mechanism to use human and other resources from the whole health system for dual task of providing essential health services and responding to pandemic cases | Ministry of Health; Health care providers   | Mechanism to use human and other resources from the whole health system for dual task determined by private sector, HECC/DMSC and approved by National Taskforce |
| Prepare to enact a sunset law on pandemic response  | AGO; National Task Force;<br>Parliament   | Pandemic repose Act enacted within 4 weeks of declaration of public health emergency   |
| Activate Rapid Response Teams and<br>International Border Health units  | Ministry of Health and all institutions involved at international air and sea ports; EOC work streams | RRTs and International Border<br>Health units activated within 24<br>hours of decision by HECC   |
| Activate quarantine and isolation facilities and movement logistics workstreams   | Ministry of Health; EOC planning work stream  | Quarantine and isolation<br>facilities activated within 24<br>hours of decision by HECC/<br>DMSC   |
| Release national reserve volumes of PPE, sample collection and transport materials, antivirals  | Ministry of Health; EOC planning<br>work stream   | National stockpile of pandemic<br>medical deployed to health<br>facilities within 3 days of<br>decision by HECC/DMSC   |

| Action  | Responsible agencies  | Target   |
|---|---|--|
| Activate contingency human resource mobilisation/redeployment plan  | Ministry of Health; EOC planning work stream  | Contingency HR mobilisation activated within 24 hours of decision by HECC/DMSC   |
| Prepare for provision of shelter and relief   | National Disaster Management<br>Authority and Maldives Red<br>Crescent; EOC workstreams   | Operational technical planning activated for relief within 24 hours of decision by HECC/DMSC                                       |
| Activate research and analysis work stream to support intelligence and forecasting the epidemic and response requirements                           | Ministry of Health; Maldives<br>National University; EOC<br>planning work stream  | Research and analysis team of MNU activated within 24 hours of decision by HECC/DMSC   |
| Prepare timely communication of travel restrictions and closure of international borders  | Institutions involved at border with Ministry of Tourism, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Economic Development; EOC work streams | Border response plans and communication plans activated within 24 hours of decision by National Task Force                         |
| Prepare for short notice international border closures and managing stranded locals abroad and travelers in the country                             | Ministry of Foreign Affairs,<br>Tourism, Employment; EOC<br>planning workstream   | Contingency shelter, relief<br>and repatriation procedures<br>developed and endorsed by<br>HECC/DMSC                               |
| Prepare for increasing national reserves of essential commodities, in anticipation of supply chains being disrupted by the pandemic internationally | Ministry of Health; NDMA;<br>National Task Force; HECC/<br>DMSC, State Trading<br>Organization, Ministry of<br>Economic Development       | Business continuity plans<br>in supply chain activated to<br>ensure supply and stock of<br>essential commodities in the<br>country |
| Monitor national stockpile of food supplies and essential commodities   | State Trading Organisation; EOC work streams  | Stock-update of essential supplies reported at regular intervals to HECC/DMSC  |
| Prepare additional stockpile requirement of medicines, medical supplies, laboratory supplies and medicines and monitor usage                        | Ministry of Health; EOC<br>planning work stream, STO and<br>Ministry of Finance   | National requirement of medical supplies prepared within 7 days of decision by HECC/DMSC   |
| Order medical supplies for the case<br>management (medicines, PPE and other<br>supplies) following a pandemic declaration<br>by WHO                 | Ministry of Health; EOC<br>planning work stream, STO and<br>Ministry of Finance   | Order placed for essential<br>medical supplies for<br>pandemic response within 3<br>days of approval of national<br>requirement    |
| Plan and identify procurement mechanisms to obtain pandemic vaccine (if available) following a pandemic declaration by WHO.                         | Ministry of Health; National<br>Task Force; EOC planning work<br>stream, Ministry of Finance,<br>Ministry of Foreign Affairs              | Financial and legal<br>arrangements initiated within<br>24 hours of decision by HECC/<br>DMSC                                      |

| Action  | Responsible agencies  | Target   |
|---|---|--|
| Prepare for regulatory review and approval of new vaccines and treatment products   | Maldives Food and Drug Authority  | Medicine regulatory arrangement initiated within 24 hours of decision by HECC/DMSC to purchase new medicines or vaccines |
| Activate Atoll and island task forces and prepare for island emergency operations centers. Activate Atoll and island task forces and prepare for island emergency operations centers. | Ministry of Health; EOC planning work stream  | Atoll Task forces activated within 24 hours of decision by HECC/DMSC   |
| Conduct training of health care workers on disease prevention and case management, use of PPE and IPC   | Ministry of Health; EOC planning<br>work stream, all health facilities, all<br>essential service institutions | Training plan developed and training initiated within 3 days of decision by HECC/DMSC                                    |
| Conduct training of other frontline workers on diseases prevention and handling of waste  | Ministry of Health; EOC planning work stream, all essential service institutions                              | Front line workers training initiated within 3 days of decision by HECC/DMSC   |
| Identify possible burial sites, safety measures for handling dead bodies and train all involved   | Ministry of Health, Male' City<br>Council, LGA, Atoll/Island Councils;<br>EOC planning work stream            | Burial sites and protocols<br>developed within 3 days of<br>decision by HECC/DMSC  |
| Hold regular meetings of HECC/DMSC and MAC and increase frequency as required   | Ministry of Health; EOC planning workstream   | HECC/DMSC and MAC meetings<br>held weekly or as determined<br>by HECC/DMSC   |
| Commence response-evaluation with relevant work streams and produce response resource requirements linking with epidemiological analysis from surveillance                            | Ministry of Health; Maldives<br>National University; EOC work<br>streams                                      | Weekly situation analysis and response reports prepared and presented to HECC/DMSC                                       |
| Develop indicators for monitoring the epidemiological situation and agree on thresholds for increasing/releasing measures   | Ministry of Health; Health<br>Protection Agency   | Indicators and thresholds finalised and monitored daily and weekly   |
| Review and plan for an escalation to the next phases (prevent spread and respond to surge) and develop detailed operational and tactical response.                                    | All institutions; EOC planning workstream   | Plan for escalation for next<br>phases presented to HECC/<br>DMSC following alert by WHO of a<br>pandemic                |

| Action   | Responsible agencies  | Target   |
|--|---|--|
| Conduct health and socioeconomic research into the pandemic situation and forecast its progression and impact  | All institutions; EOC planning workstream Universities;   | Epidemiological forecasts,<br>health and socio-economic<br>impact assessed and<br>disseminated for planning<br>mitigation and recovery                     |
| National programmes and health facilities to utilise PHC approaches to provide essential public health interventions (vaccinations, maternity care, mental health and emergency health care; homebased care) with minimal disruption | Ministry of Health; Health<br>Protection Agency, EOC<br>planning work stream;<br>Healthcare providers; Aasandha | Essential public health services<br>and emergency health care<br>provided without disruption<br>through PHC approaches                                     |
| Plan for bulk supplies management at border and storage according to policy in border management operations.   | National Disaster Management<br>Authority; EOC work streams   | Operations and tactical plans<br>developed for managing<br>purchased aid supplies at<br>border and for storage within 7<br>days of placing purchase orders |



## Function Surveillance and situation analysis

| Action  | Responsible agencies                                     | Target  |
|---|--|---|
| Conduct risk assessment following alert<br>by WHO of a disease of international health<br>concern or when a previously known disease<br>has been shown to have more severe<br>symptoms/complications<br>than previously known | Health Protection Agency                                 | Risk assessment completed<br>within 48 hours of alert by WHO<br>of a disease of international<br>health concern or of a disease<br>with increasing severity               |
| Issue a case definition consistent with WHO case definitions and provide technical advice to border health, tourist establishments and healthcare facilities.   | Health Protection Agency                                 | Interim case definition issued within 24 hours of WHO's interim case definition and/ or alert by WHO of a disease of international health concern and updated as required |
| Introduce enhanced surveillance and reporting and follow up those meeting case definition   | Health Protection Agency supported by other institutions | Case notification requirement issued to health care providers and all institutions including border, tourist establishments, schools and workplaces                       |
| Review recent surveillance of cases that meet case definitions and other diseases relevant to the case definition   | Health Protection Agency                                 | Weekly epidemiolocal report prepared from relevant surveillance data and shared with HECC/DMSC  |

| Action  | Responsible agencies  | Target  |
|---|---|---|
| Conduct intensive case-based surveillance through primary health care service providers, medical centers, hospital emergency departments, private medical clinics and laboratories to detect possible imported cases and secondary cases. | Health Protection Agency;<br>Health care facilities; EOC work<br>streams  | Weekly surveillance report prepared and shared with HECC/DMSC   |
| Conduct surveillance of animal health if the pandemic potential agent involves animal to human transmission.  | Ministry of Fisheries Marine<br>Resources and Agriculture   | Animal surveillance report presented to HECC/DMSC (if the pandemic agent is transmitted from animals to humans)   |
| Prepare to implement active surveillance in the community, targeting groups at high risk of exposure (e.g. at borders; health facilities; travel and tourism; supply chain)   | Health Protection Agency; EOC<br>work streams   | Active surveillance protocols developed within 24 hours of decision by HECC/DMSC and start implementing within 48 hours                                     |
| Implement Real-time surveillance reporting (suspected cases; viral characteristics, and monitoring of trends in helpline calls; international situation) and create surveillance summaries  | Health Protection Agency; EOC<br>work streams   | Prepare daily reports from<br>all surveillance sources and<br>collate for weekly HECC/DMSC<br>meetings  |
| Carry out surveillance of travelers with health declaration and temperature monitoring and any other symptomatic/other screening as required at air and seaports  | Health Protection Agency; EOC<br>work streams, all institutions<br>involved at international air and<br>sea ports | Updated health declaration forms implemented at sea and airports with temperature monitoring within 24 hours of decision by HECC/DMSC                       |
| Conduct case investigation and contact tracing of all suspected cases   | Health Protection Agency; EOC<br>work streams   | Case investigation and contact tracing completed within 24 hours for each suspected case  |
| Advise WHO of any border measures implemented as required under the International Health Regulations 2005 and provide WHO with the rationale for and relevant scientific information concerning their implementation.                     | Health Protection Agency; EOC<br>work streams   | Communications sent to<br>WHO and Foreign Ministry<br>liaison within 24 hours of<br>National taskforce decisions<br>to implement border control<br>measures |



| Action   | Responsible agencies   | Target  |
|--|--|---|
| Update resources such as forms, templates, guidelines and content of orientation programmes developed for border management in emergencies.  | Health Protection Agency<br>(IBH) and all agencies involved<br>at airports and seaports<br>operations  | SOPs, templates and guidelines updated within 3 days of convening HECC/DMSC   |
| Activate coordination mechanisms between border agencies at international ports (including those in the Atolls) to ensure interventions are well coordinated.  | All agencies involved at airports and seaports operations  | Border operations teams<br>activated and work stream<br>initiated within 24 hours<br>convening HECC/DMSC  |
| Issue travel advisories as appropriate, including defining the areas/countries of concern, within which border measures may be applied.  | Health Protection Agency; Technical Advisory Committee, Civil Aviation Authority, and all other agencies involved at airports and sea ports operations | Travel advisories<br>communicated with all border<br>agencies within 12 hours of<br>issuance by HPA   |
| Provide information to incoming and outgoing travelers.  | All agencies involved at airports<br>and seaports operations, EOC<br>work streams  | Travel information made<br>available to all agencies<br>involved at borders, tourist<br>establishments and Foreign<br>ministry  |
| Advise on exit procedures in areas of concern, and on border measures being used in other countries.   | Ministry of Foreign Affairs and<br>Health Protection Agency, EOC<br>work streams   | Information on exit procedures in areas of concern, and on border measures being used in other countries updated to HECC/DMSC weekly  |
| Activate procedure for alerting agencies managing facilities that are to be used for quarantine and transit of travelers   | All agencies involved at airports and seaports operations  | Procedure activated within 48 hours of designating quarantine facilities for travelers  |
| Conduct exercises and drills for different border scenarios  | All agencies involved at airports and seaports operations  | At least one Interagency exercise/ drill conducted annually   |
| In addition to routine requirements by the IBH, obtain health declaration for all passengers/crew, and a list of crew/ passengers (including their country of origin) that have embarked/disembarked from the marine vessel throughout its journey within a specified time period till reaching Maldives (including all ports of call) | Agencies involved at seaports; Maritime operators and shipping agents  | Additional requirements of health declarations and interventions required from marine vessels shared with all marine vessel operators within 12 hours of issuance of the decision |
| Activate advanced passenger notification systems and direct questioning of operators for aircrafts from high-risk areas  | Health Protection Agency,<br>Civil Aviation Authority and<br>Immigration; Airline operators  | Advance notification protocols agreed with immigration, airlines and border health within 48 hours of decision by HECC/DMSC   |

| Action  | Responsible agencies  | Target   |
|---|---|--|
| Make preparations to sanitize aircrafts and marine vessels.   | Health Protection Agency, Technical Advisory Committee, Air and Sea port management institution (Maldives Ports Limited, Maldives Airports Company Limited) and other institutions involved at border | SOP for sanitizing aircrafts and<br>marine vessels updated within<br>48 hours of initiating border<br>operations   |
| Institute procedure to grant pratique to aircraft/marine vessel once the public health risk has been managed, including positive pratique (100 percent health status reporting required from all incoming aircrafts and marine vessels) | Health Protection Agency (Director<br>General of Public Health); EOC legal<br>work stream   | Requirements to grant pratique<br>shared with marine operators<br>and airline operators and<br>procedure communicated with<br>IBH within 48 hours of decision                        |
| Plan to increase public health presence at international airports and implement processes for referral, assessment and screening of travelers.  | All agencies involved at airports operations  | Human resources mobilized<br>for border health and presence<br>increased at borders within 3<br>days of decision by HECC/DMSC  |
| Obtain contact-tracing information (flight manifests, seating arrangement) from passengers arriving from areas of concern to be shared with HPA   | Civil Aviation Authority and<br>Immigration; Airline operators  | SoP for sharing passenger information of travelers established within 24 hours of notification of border measures by HPA   |
| Plan to increase public health presence at international airports and implement processes for referral, assessment and screening of travelers.  | Health Protection Agency;<br>Immigration; Tourism and Foreign<br>ministries   | Immigration protocols updated<br>within 48 hours of decision by<br>National Task Force on visa and<br>entry limitations  |
| Advise all travelers to and from Maldives by air, of the escalating situation regarding the threat of a pandemic, and inform them they may be placed in mandatory quarantine for acertain period on arrival                             | Civil Aviation Authority and<br>Immigration; Airline operators  | Make information on<br>quarantine and isolation<br>available to all travel and<br>tourism sector operators and<br>foreign liaisons within 12 hours<br>of decision                    |
| Assess suspect cases at the border using case definitions and travel history, as advised by the Health Protection Agency  | All agencies involved at air and seaports operations  | Arrangements made at airports to examine and take samples for diagnosing suspected cases within 48 hours of activation of border measures  |
| Designate quarantine/isolation areas<br>and separate pathway for suspected<br>passengers are designated at all airports<br>and sea ports  | All agencies involved at air and seaports operations; Tourism industry resorts, safari boats and guesthouses  | Areas identified and pathways created within 48 hours of initiating border control measures.   |
| Prepare to implement cluster control activities at ports  | Tourism industry resorts, safari<br>boats and guesthouses   | Activate quarantine and isolation facilities for tourists and travelers within 48 hours of report of a suspected case and containment measures at resorts and tourist establishments |



### Function Preparedness and control interventions

| Action   | Responsible agencies   | Target  |
|--|--|---|
| Update forms and templates for health declaration, case notification, case investigation, contact tracing, quarantine and isolation notices and share with relevant work streams           | Health Protection Agency; TAC and EOC Standards work streams                           | Forms and templates reviewed and updated within 3 days of activation of EOC and reviewed periodically with emergence of new evidence and situation  |
| Activate a clinical management advisory team (CMAT) of medical experts to advice on clinical care  | Ministry of Health; TAC; national referral hospital                                    | CMAT convened and operations initiated with the detection of first case   |
| Review and update materials for employers, employees and other workplace participants containing key messages for workplaces to help them plan for, prepare for and respond to a pandemic. | Health Protection Agency; EOC<br>Standards work stream                                 | Guidelines updated for workplaces, tourist establishment, sports and other social activities updated within 10 days of activation of EOC and reviewed periodically with emergence of new evidence and situation |
| Update guidelines for workplaces, tourist establishments, waste management, schools, sports and other social activities and implement is all institutions                                  | Health Protection Agency; TAC and EOC Standards work streams                           | Guidelines updated for workplaces, tourist establishment, sports and other social activities updated within 10 days of activation of EOC and reviewed periodically with emergence of new evidence and situation |
| Once a suspect case is reported, arrange logistics for movement of the person and activate SoP for the suspected case to be at hospital or another designated facility.                    | EOC work streams; Tourist establishments; Air and seaports; Health care institutions;  | Logistics arrangements in place<br>for movement of suspected or<br>confirmed cases to designated<br>facilities or hospitals within<br>48 hours of notification by<br>surveillance work stream                   |
| Prepare to implement isolation and cluster control activities at tourist establishments.   | Tourism industry resorts, safari<br>boats and guesthouses; EOC work<br>streams         | Arrangements made at tourist resorts and other tourist establishments to quarantine and isolate suspected cases, segregation of workers and work areas  |
| Isolate those whose symptoms do not require hospitalization and quarantine those without symptoms.   | EOC work streams   | Facility for quarantine/isolation of suspected cases identified within 48 hours of activation of EOC  |
| Make arrangements to issue legal notice of quarantine and isolation  | Health Protection Agency<br>(Director General Public<br>Health); EOC legal work stream | Procedure established to issue written legal notice to the person within 48 hours on placing in quarantine or isolation   |

| Action  | Responsible agencies  | Target   |
|---|---|--|
| Prepare phone hotline/online application to enable people to contact EOC for reporting symptoms, receiving test results, and documentation on quarantine, de-isolation, recovery and travel     | EOC information technology<br>workstream; EOC other<br>workstreams            | Online application (like<br>Haalubelun used in Covid19<br>pandemic) launched with the<br>detection of first case in the<br>country                             |
| Prepare and orient healthcare providers on clinical guidelines, including for the use of personal protective equipment, antivirals and antibiotics, and vaccination procedures (if applicable). | Technical Advisory Committee;<br>health care institutions; EOC<br>workstreams | Training for healthcare professionals initiated within 3 days of activation of EOC and initial training completed for all health care providers within 10 days |
| Plan to activate a vaccination work streams (one for procurement and one for deployment) to start targeted immunization once the vaccine is available.  | Ministry of Health  | Vaccine procurement and deployment workstreams activated within 3 days of indication from WHO of availability of vaccine                                       |



| Action  | Responsible agencies   | Target   |
|---|--|--|
| Disseminate materials for employers, employees and other workplace participants containing key messages for workplaces to help them plan for, prepare for and respond to a pandemic.                                      | Health Protection Agency; EOC<br>Standards work stream                                 | Guidelines updated<br>for workplaces, tourist<br>establishment, sports and other<br>social activities shared with all<br>agencies and make available<br>on pandemic website within 10<br>days of activation of EOC |
| Appoint spokesperson for the pandemic response  | National Task Force  | Spokesperson appointed within 24 hours of EOC activation   |
| Establish a pandemic website or web page to provide key information for the public and agencies to guide their planning and response.   | Ministry of Health; EOC communications work stream                                     | Pandemic web page made available within 3 days of EOC activation   |
| Prepare a detailed communication action plan based on the risk communication strategy incorporating feedback from social media listening, media monitoring, call center reports, and other agency intelligence (ongoing). | Ministry of Health; EOC communications work stream                                     | Detailed communication operations plan and media monitoring procedures developed within 10 days of EOC activation  |
| Review key messages and promulgate<br>new messages to reach all segments of the<br>population (including foreign migrants,<br>blind and deaf) reflecting prevention and<br>other pandemic response actions                | Ministry of Health; EOC communications work stream                                     | Key message dissemination to<br>public (including migrants and<br>PWDs) started through multiple<br>media platforms and languages<br>within 14 days of EOC activation  |
| Review and increase the frequency of press updates (to once or twice daily).  | Ministry of Health; EOC communications work streams                                    | Frequency and mode of press<br>briefings determined within 24<br>hours of appointing spokesperson<br>and reviewed periodically   |
| Review and update public information in conjunction with all key agencies (ongoing).  | Ministry of Health; EOC communications work streams; All sectors                       | Monitor target audience information needs and messaging adjusted accordingly   |
| Liaise with WHO and other international agencies and countries on situation in the country, actions and border measures   | Ministry of Health; EOC<br>communications work streams;<br>Foreign Ministry            | Hold regular catchup meetings<br>with WHO for situation briefs<br>nationally and internationally<br>from the time of EOC activation  |
| Provide information to tourists and other foreign visitors in the country   | Ministry of Health; EOC<br>communications work streams;<br>Tourism ad Foreign Ministry | Messages for travelers available at airports, ferry terminals, tourist establishments and websites of immigration, pandemic web page and social media account of HPA   |

| Action   | Responsible agencies  | Target  |
|--|---|---|
| Provide information on national response policies to Maldivian citizens in other countries   | Foreign Ministry; EOC communications work streams   | Messages for pubic available through radio/TV, pandemic web page and social media accounts of HPA and MoH and other social media applications like viber/WhatsApp etc to cover situation, public health and response measures |
| Monitor misinformation, evaluate and refresh media campaigns (ongoing).  | Ministry of Health; EOC communications work stream; media                                   | Media monitoring and listening conducted daily and make adjustments to messaging  |
| Activate national call center with the national Helpline number to provide information and clinical advice to the public, and use regular monitoring of calls to refresh scripts | Ministry of Health; Call center;<br>EOC communications work<br>stream                       | National call center activated within 48 hours of EOC activation and expanded as required   |
| Introduce as appropriate other helplines for sectors (psychosocial support; social protection and relief; tourism)   | Ministry of Health; Call center;<br>EOC communications work<br>stream; sectoral workstreams | Helplines for social support and<br>protection, PSS, EMS and other<br>essential services established<br>within 10 days of EOC activation  |
| Distribute situation reports and surveillance summaries to other workstreams and the public as required.   | Ministry of Health; Call center;<br>EOC communications work<br>stream                       | Situation reports of surveillance<br>and response shared at EOC<br>meetings daily and HECC/DMSC<br>meetings weekly  |
| Test and update standard operating procedures for case notification, surveillance, case management, testing infection control and burial and share with workstreams              | Health Protection Agency; TAC and EOC Standards work streams                                | SoPs tested, updated and made available on pandemic webpage and shared with all healthcare providers, EOC clusters and workstreams  |
| Establish multi-sector press briefing mechanism through EOC  | Ministry of Health; EOC communications work stream  | EOC press briefing includes updates from non-health work streams  |
| Maintain pandemic website with information on situation, guidelines and response actions   | Ministry of Health; EOC communications work stream and other workstreams                    | Pandemic website updated daily and updated versions of technical material, guidelines and response information available to public  |
| Establish pandemic dashboard for statistical updates and Real Time data  | Ministry of Health; EOC<br>communications and surveillance<br>workstreams                   | Dashboard containing statistics of disease and epidemiological parameters, testing, quarantine and isolation and (vaccination if available) updated daily   |
| Brief staff, cluster heads and key decision-<br>makers on a daily basis  | EOC director; Operations Incident<br>Command  | Daily huddle of EOC cluster<br>heads, HECC/DMSC meetings  |



| Action  | Responsible agencies                         | Target  |
|---|--|---|
| Update ToRs for each EOC cluster  | EOC director; Operations<br>Incident Command | ToRs updated and clusters oriented within 24 hours of EOC activation  |
| Update and maintain workflow and communications flow for each cluster and at EOC  | EOC director; Operations<br>Incident Command | Workflow and communication<br>flow charts updated and EOC<br>clusters updated within 48 hours<br>of EOC   |
| Orient cluster heads and other responders on the use of pandemic information management system (outbreak system)  | EOC director; Operations<br>Incident Command | Orientation of EOC cluster head completed within 48 hours of EOC activation and all other EOC cluster responders oriented on the use of outbreak system within 10days |
| Keep up to date with national policy and advice issued by the National Task force and Health Protection Agency  | EOC director; Operations<br>Incident Command | Decisions of HECC/DMSC shared with EOC workstreams and other workstreams same day   |
| Lead response within the agency and with the sector they serve.   | EOC director; Operations<br>Incident Command | Representation of other sectors at HECC/DMSC lead the sector actions within their organizations   |
| Hold periodic orientation sessions for all<br>work streams and answer queries from<br>the relevant sector, particularly for new<br>responders joining the workstreams   | EOC director; Operations<br>Incident Command | Regular (minimum weekly) sessions for all EOC and other workstreams to share updates and changes in response operations   |
| Maintain record of all resources and update on a weekly basis. A record keeper should be appointed, who doesn't participate in the activities of any cluster or imparts any input at meetings but solely keeps records of all the events, meetings, all the published materials (reports, SOPs, guidelines, circulars etc.), collects and keeps all the meeting minutes, and keep track of things in chronological order. | EOC director; Operations<br>Incident Command | Record of resources (human,<br>material and financial) update<br>weekly   |
| Ensure established procedures are followed for procurement and release of resources   | EOC director; Operations<br>Incident Command | Record of paperwork reviewed and updated weekly   |
| Maintain coordination with other agencies through established national and atoll mechanisms.  | EOC director; Operations<br>Incident Command | Hold weekly operations<br>meeting with atoll task forces<br>and other agencies from the<br>activation of EOC  |
| Ensure each agency's single point of contact details are disseminated to other agencies.  | EOC director; Operations<br>Incident Command | Maintain and update contact<br>details of focal points for each<br>sector available to all EOC and<br>workstream heads  |

| Action  | Responsible agencies                         | Target  |
|---|--|---|
| Provide security and protection for responders  | EOC director; Operations<br>Incident Command | Round the clock security for EOC established from the time of activation of EOC   |
| Provide alternative accommodations for frontline responders   | EOC director; Operations<br>Incident Command | Alternative accommodation<br>arrangements made for first<br>responders within 48 hours<br>decision by National Task Force           |
| Maintain hygiene and IPC at EOC   | EOC director; Operations<br>Incident Command | EOC cleaning and IPC measures monitored twice daily   |
| Identify a place for disinfection of vehicles used by rapid response teams and establish a mechanism for the movement of suspected or confirmed cases | EOC director; Operations<br>Incident Command | Place identified for disinfection of vehicles used in response  |
| Maintain stock for EOC operations   | EOC director; Operations<br>Incident Command | Stock records reviewed and tallied weekly   |
| Maintain internet and telecommunications connectivity throughout the operations   | EOC director; Operations<br>Incident Command | Telephone connections and internet connections functional round the clock and downtime minimized to less than 2 hrs on any occasion |
| Maintain functionality of the Outbreak system and have onsite troubleshooting arrangements  | EOC director; Operations<br>Incident Command | Outbreak system functioning and downtime minimized to less than 2 hrs on any occasion   |
| Have mechanism to mobilize communication and technology resources as required to expand EOC functions   | EOC director; Operations<br>Incident Command | Adequate computers, telephones and other devices available for operations from the  |
| Have vehicles and vessels operational with regular repair and maintenance   | EOC director; Operations<br>Incident Command | Vessels and vehicles checked weekly for repair needs  |
| Have access to food and water, and facilities for personal hygiene at EOC   | EOC director; Operations<br>Incident Command | Meals, drinking water, toilet facilities and prayer rooms made available for EOC responders   |
| Ensure response staff are given the opportunity for rest and recuperation as well as psychosocial support.  | EOC director; Operations<br>Incident Command | Mandatory daily breaks<br>and fortnightly off hours<br>implemented for all responders   |

## Prevent spread phase: Containment (local alert level 2-3:YELLOW-ORANGE)

**Trigger:** Novel pandemic virus case(s) detected in the country and the recommendation of the national risk assessment (corresponds to Global Pandemic phase)

**Strategy:** Contain the disease to the cluster or to the island; Relief and protection provided; IPC practiced at institutions and households

### Function Planning and coordination

| Action  | Responsible agencies  | Target   |
|---|---|--|
| Review actions and decisions in the context of information provided in situation updates, and escalate the response as necessary and in accordance with institutions response plans.  | EOC clusters and all institutions and industries; HECC/DMSC                                     | Decisions reviewed by HECC/DMSC and<br>National task force at regular intervals<br>(daily or as determined by HECC/<br>DMSC) based on situation analysis |
| Provide information from surveillance<br>and epidemiological analysis which<br>will facilitate informed policy and<br>operational decisions to assess the<br>need for escalation of response at<br>national, atolls and island levels | Ministry of Health; EOC planning<br>work stream   | Share regular updates (as determined<br>by HECC/DMSC) on situation and<br>response with HECC/DMSC and<br>National task force                             |
| Coordinate and provide information to national and international agencies, including to WHO.  | Health Protection; EOC<br>surveillance workstream; Foreign<br>Ministry                          | Situation updates shared with WHO and other international agencies   |
| Activate business continuity plans, in anticipation of staff or supply chains being disrupted by the pandemic in the country and/or internationally   | Ministry of Health; EOC planning<br>work stream   | Local supply chain business continuity plans activated within 24 hours of detection of a case in the country   |
| Map available and committed resources and send out proposals for external aid and mobilizing funds  | Ministry of Health; EOC planning<br>work stream; Finance and foreign<br>ministries; UN Maldives | Proposals developed for finance and<br>other resource mobilization within 10<br>days of detection of first case in the<br>country                        |
| Prepare for the "Respond to Surge" phase with human and other resource requirement in consideration of higher attack rate and severity  | Ministry of Health; EOC planning work stream; HECC/DMSC   | Surge response operational activities initiated within 48 hours of detection of first case in the country  |

| Action  | Responsible agencies  | Target   |
|---|---|--|
| Determine national prioritization criteria<br>for the distribution and usage of critical<br>goods and services that may be in short<br>supply and specific goods and services<br>required by infants,<br>elderly and PWDs             | Ministry of Health; EOC planning workstream   | National priority areas and groups identified for the provision of essential goods and services            |
| Activate increasing hospital bed capacity to respond to surge   | Ministry of Health; EOC planning work stream; HECC/DMSC   | Temporary medical care facility constructed within one month of decision                                   |
| Review plans for Ease and Resurgence and update triggers for ease.  | Ministry of Health; EOC planning work stream  | Ease plans and triggers reviewed and updated based on disease progression                                  |
| Release antivirals and other medical supplies for use and monitor antiviral usage.  | Ministry of Health; EOC planning and medical supplies work stream                                   | Antivirals and other medical supplies dispatched to designated facilities with the detection of first case |
| Release supplies for designated laboratories and monitor the use of test kits and reagents  | Ministry of Health; EOC planning and medical supplies work stream                                   | Laboratory supplies released to designated labs regularly and weekly stock updates shared with EOC         |
| Plan for provision and supply of medical oxygen and medical gas for patient care  | Ministry of Health; State Trading<br>Organization; EOC planning and<br>medical supplies work stream | Medical gas production capacity increased and buffer stock of oxygen maintained                            |
| Release supplies for designated laboratories and monitor the use of test kits and reagents  | Ministry of Health; EOC planning and medical supplies work stream                                   | Laboratory supplies released to designated labs regularly and weekly stock updates shared with EOC         |
| Order sufficient viral test primer and laboratory capacity, clarify supply constraints, and ensure human resources are available to provide a timely response to increased testing requirements.                                      | Ministry of Health; State Trading<br>Organization; EOC planning and<br>medical supplies work stream | Laboratory capacity increased and buffer stock for testing maintained                                      |
| Coordinate delivery of essential public health interventions (vaccinations, maternity care, mental health and emergency health care; home based care) with minimal disruption   | Ministry of Health; EOC planning<br>workstream; Healthcare providers;<br>Aasandha                   | Essential public health services and emergency health care provided without disruption                     |
| Coordinate with social health insurance providers to institute processes to allow care for regular health care with online prescriptions and issuance of medicines from pharmacies and approvals for emergency referral or evacuation | Ministry of Health; EOC planning<br>workstream; Healthcare providers;<br>Aasandha                   | Online processes accepted by<br>Aasandha for medical services<br>provided during the pandemic<br>response  |

| Action   | Responsible agencies   | Target   |
|--|--|--|
| Mobilize additional human resources in preparation for responding to surge   | Ministry of Health; EOC planning work stream   | Additional human resources mobilized and oriented to the operations SOPs   |
| Prepare to activate additional quarantine and isolation sites and increase logistics support   | Ministry of Health; EOC planning work stream   | Additional quarantine and isolation facilities, vehicles and vessels mobilized for the EOC                                 |
| Continue training of health care providers and frontline workers, highlighting any changes with emerging evidence and operations                 | Ministry of Health; EOC planning work stream   | Training continued regularly for health care providers and frontline workers with updates                                  |
| Report on the case load on healthcare workers and response capacity of the health system   | Ministry of Health; EOC planning work stream   | Health system capacity report presented to HECC/DMSC weekly or as determine by HECC/DMSC                                   |
| Conduct health and socioeconomic research into the pandemic situation and forecast its progression and impact                                    | All institutions; EOC planning workstream Universities;  | Epidemiological forecasts, health and socio-economic impact assessed and disseminated for planning mitigation and recovery |
| Plan to received pandemic vaccine (if ordered in the previous phase); if not, plan to order vaccines (if available) globally                     | Ministry of Health; Ministry of Finance, Attorney General's office, Maldives Food and drug Authority   | Financial, legal and medicine regulatory requirements fulfilled prior to estimated date of delivery of vaccine             |
| Prepare for vaccine logistics including cold chain monitoring, deployment and monitoring of adverse events following immunization (AEFIs)        | Ministry of Health; EOC<br>planning work stream; National<br>immunization Programme,<br>Maldives Food and Drug Authority;<br>Health care providers | Vaccine cold rooms and cold chain capacity increased prior to arrival of vaccine in the country                            |
| Prepare to integrate vaccine information into<br>the pandemic incident management system<br>and/or<br>national immunization information system   | Ministry of Health; EOC<br>planning work stream; National<br>immunization Programme, EOC<br>information technology work<br>stream                  | Vaccine information system integrated with the outbreak system and linked to the national immunization programme           |
| Prepare to integrate vaccine information into<br>the pandemic incident management system<br>and/or<br>national immunization information system   | Ministry of Health; EOC<br>planning work stream; National<br>immunization Programme, EOC<br>information technology work<br>stream                  | Vaccine information system integrated with the outbreak system and linked to the national immunization programme           |
| If vaccine received, release vaccine as per<br>the vaccine deployment plan supplemented<br>with communications<br>on vaccine deployment strategy | Ministry of Health; EOC planning<br>and medical supplies work stream;<br>National immunization programme   | Vaccines deployed as per plan<br>within 5 days of decision by HECC/<br>DMSC and/or National Task Force                     |



| Action   | Responsible agencies   | Target  |
|--|--|---|
| Review and update case definitions as required with emergence of new evidence  | Health Protection Agency; EOC surveillance work stream   | Case definition updated and made available to all health care providers and published on the pandemic website             |
| Update national risk assessment with subnational disaggregation and provide recommendations to HECC  | Health Protection Agency; EOC surveillance workstream  | Risk assessment presented<br>to HEOC within 24 hours of<br>detection of local case  |
| Update national risk assessment with subnational disaggregation and provide recommendations to HECC  | Health Protection Agency; EOC surveillance workstream  | Risk assessment presented<br>to HEOC within 24 hours of<br>detection of local case  |
| Update travel advisories as appropriate, including defining the areas/countries of concern within which border measures may be applied.                                      | Health Protection Agency;<br>Technical Advisory Committee                                      | Updated travel advisories<br>communicated with all border<br>agencies within 12 hours of<br>issuance by HPA               |
| Update case investigation and contract tracing guidelines based on emerging evidence and local situation   | Health Protection Agency;<br>EOC surveillance and case<br>management workstreams               | SOPs/Guidelines updated<br>within 48 hours of triggering the<br>phase   |
| If the case has overseas recent travel history (within the defined period), increase monitoring and surveillance at the border including those of staff in border operations | Health Protection Agency;<br>EOC surveillance work stream;<br>border management work<br>stream | Surveillance increased with periodic testing of airport and seaport staff as determined by HPA                            |
| If the case has not travelled overseas within the defined period, intensify surveillance with active testing in the community  | Health Protection Agency; EOC surveillance and rapid response work stream;                     | Active surveillance in the community initiated within 24 hours of detection of the local case                             |
| If the case has not travelled overseas within the defined period, intensify surveillance with active testing in the community  | Health Protection Agency; EOC surveillance and rapid response work stream;                     | Active surveillance in the community initiated within 24 hours of detection of the local case                             |
| Conduct case investigations and extensive contact-tracing of all positive cases to enable timely quarantine and isolation of suspected cases                                 | Health Protection Agency; EOC surveillance and rapid response work stream;                     | Contact tracing completed within 24 hours and suspected cases quarantined and/or isolated within 48 hours of notification |
| Conduct intensive testing to detect other cases, possible secondary cases and contacts.  | Health Protection Agency; EOC surveillance and rapid response work stream;                     | Test all high risk suspected cases and cases at risk of severity within 48 hours of placing in quarantine/isolation       |

| Action   | Responsible agencies  | Target   |
|--|---|--|
| Conduct sentinel surveillance through primary care and accident and medical and hospital emergency departments and designated clinics (e.g., Flu clinics) to detect possible cases and clusters, and notify cases to EOC for cluster control measures. | Health Protection Agency; EOC<br>surveillance and rapid response<br>work stream; Health care<br>providers | Sentinel surveillance implemented in all atolls and designated facilities in Male' area with daily testing of all cases meeting case definition required for sentinel surveillance |
| Conduct active surveillance at prisons, rehabilitation centers and state care facilities to detect possible cases and clusters and notify cases to EOC for cluster control measures.   | Health Protection Agency; EOC<br>surveillance and rapid response<br>work stream; Health care<br>providers | Active surveillance implemented in prison, rehab centers and state care facilities with testing residents as determined by HPA   |
| Continue to monitor ARI and influenza-<br>like illness and laboratory surveillance<br>of influenza. Note: depending on the<br>pandemic disease in question, the<br>laboratory surveillance and the monitored<br>disease may be different.              | Health Protection Agency; EOC surveillance and rapid response work stream; Health care providers          | ARI and ILI notification implemented and laboratory surveillance of influenzas conducted as determined by HPA  |
| Attend to reports of cases with symptoms from calls made to hotline and verify for case investigation and consider establishing island level hotlines  | Health Protection Agency;<br>Call center; EOC surveillance<br>workstream                                  | All cases with reports of symptoms verified within 24 hours of receiving the call  |
| Produce epidemiological summaries and situation reports  | Health Protection Agency; EOC surveillance workstream   | Daily analysis of epidemiological parameter of the cases prepared reported to HECC/DMSC  |
| Conduct laboratory analysis of virus characteristics and collaborate internationally for gene sequencing to identify virus strain  | Health Protection Agency; EOC surveillance and laboratory workstream                                      | Virus characteristics analyzed<br>and virus strain identified<br>within a month of detection of<br>firs case   |
| Conduct epidemiological and response analysis and forecasts to informs policy and operational decisions from escalation of response at national, atolls and island levels  | Health Protection Agency; EOC surveillance workstream   | Weekly and monthly epidemiological analysis produced and updates made available to EOC clusters  |
| Continue to monitor the situation overseas.  | Health Protection Agency; EOC surveillance workstream   | International pandemic<br>situation updated prepared<br>daily and reported to HECC/<br>DMSC  |



| Action  | Responsible agencies   | Target  |
|---|--|---|
| Determine health criteria for international and domestic travelers and exit assessment procedures for travelers, based on the country situation and risk of exporting in line with WHO guidance and IHR requirements and share with HECC/DMSC and all agencies and public | Health Protection Agency; EOC<br>surveillance workstream, border<br>health work stream; Tourism.<br>Transport and Foreign ministries | Health requirement for departure<br>form Maldives determined and<br>shared with HECC/DMSC/National<br>Taskforce and the public      |
| Implement evidence-based border restriction measures  | Health Protection Agency; EOC surveillance workstream  | Border restriction decisions are updated within 24 h ours of emerging new evidence  |
| Continue to do contact tracing, mandatory quarantine of suspected cases among travelers and their contacts and isolation of suspected cases and testing as required and provide advice to contacts on social distancing   | Health Protection Agency; EOC<br>surveillance workstream, border<br>health work stream; Tourism and<br>Foreign ministries            | Contact tracing conducted and traveler isolated within 24 hours of notification   |
| Ensure those travelers in quarantine and isolation can access food, medications and treatment for existing conditions, and are referred to welfare agencies for social support needs.   | Health Protection Agency; EOC surveillance workstream, border health work stream; Tourism and Foreign ministries                     | Food and essential commodities provided to travelers in quarantine and psychosocial support provided while in quarantine            |
| Continue surveillance of travelers entering the country with health declaration, requirement for additional evidence of laboratory test, temperature and other symptoms monitoring at air and seaports  | Health Protection Agency; EOC surveillance workstream, border health work stream   | Updated health declaration forms implemented at sea and airports with temperature monitoring with 24 hours of decision by HECC/DMSC |
| Implement IPC and other public health measures at ports   | Health Protection Agency; EOC surveillance workstream, border health work stream   | IPC measures determined by HPA implemented at airports  |
| Maintain facilities for assessment and taking samples for testing and temporary isolation at airports   | Health Protection Agency; EOC surveillance workstream, border health work stream   | Temporary quarantine and isolation facilities maintained at airports  |



# Function Preparedness and control interventions

| Action  | Responsible agencies   | Target   |
|---|--|--|
| Monitor health of contacts and suspected cases while at home in quarantine and/or isolation and assess psychosocial needs   | EOC case management workstreams; CRT/NERF; CMAT  | All contacts and cases at home contacted once of alternate days to assess health and needs   |
| Isolate cases and treat according to clinical advice and guidelines.  | EOC case management workstreams;<br>CMAT; Healthcare providers                         | Cases meeting clinical monitoring moved to isolation facilities and/or designated hospital for observation and treatment                     |
| Monitor health status of health care workers, assess and report to EOC for case investigation   | Health care providers; EOC case management workstreams                                 | Weekly updates of healthcare workers affected reported to EOC  |
| Test suspect cases, using the PCR test or other tests recommended; test cases in the community or in a hospital when clinically indicated; provide information to suspect cases by telephone. | EOC case management workstreams;<br>laboratory work stream; CERT/NERF                  | All suspected cases tested at defined period   |
| Initiate sample transfer protocols for infectious materials across islands  | EOC case management workstreams; laboratory work stream; CERT/NERF                     | Samples transferred as per protocols for labelling and packaging for testing within 48 hours of sample collection                            |
| Start one or more flu clinics for assessment of suspected cases with sperate physical pathways from regular health care services  | EOC case management workstreams; health care providers                                 | At least one flu clinics established on islands with cases   |
| Initiate infectious disease and non-<br>infectious disease pathways in health<br>care facilities  | EOC case management workstreams; health care providers                                 | At least one flu clinics established on islands with cases   |
| Provide psychosocial support and mental health care   | Ministry of Health; EOC case<br>management workstreams; CMAT;<br>Healthcare providers  | Protocol separate pathway implemented in all health care facilities  |
| Update quarantine, isolation and IPC guidelines based on emerging evidence and local situation  | Health Protection Agency; EOC surveillance and case management workstreams             | SOPs/Guidelines updated within 48 hours of triggering each phase   |
| Liaise with local ambulance services<br>for emergency transfer of patients<br>(pandemic disease and other medical<br>emergencies)   | EOC case management workstreams;<br>CERT/NERF; EMS                                     | EMS activated to provide emergency transfer of sever cases to designated hospitals   |
| Activate a mobile medical response team to attend to those at home requiring medical assessment in movement control aeras   | EOC case management workstreams;<br>CRT/NERF; Health care professional<br>Associations | Mobile medical response teams provide online consultations to all calls to hotline with medical problems and provide home visits as required |

| Action   | Responsible agencies   | Target   |
|--|--|--|
| Activate phone/online application to enable people to contact EOC for reporting symptoms, receiving test results, and documentation on quarantine, de-isolation, recovery and travel           | EOC information technology<br>workstream; EOC other workstreams                | Online application (e.g.<br>Haalubelun used in Covid19<br>pandemic) available  |
| Enforce mandatory quarantine and isolating of contacts, suspected cases and cases.   | EOC case management workstreams;<br>CERT/NERT; Police, local councils          | Quarantine and isolation enforced within 24 hours of notification  |
| If public health emergency is not already in force, consider declaring a state of public health emergency under Public Health 07/2012.   | Health Protection Agency (DGPH);<br>Ministry of Health; National Task<br>Force | Public health emergency declared   |
| Consider closure of educational facilities and other establishments where large number of periods longer than those determined by Health Protection Agency and activate online teaching        | Health Protection Agency (DGPH);<br>HECC/DMSC; National Task Force             | Educational facilities and other<br>establishments closed within 12<br>hours of decision by National Task<br>Force   |
| Consider closure of specific premises and/or prohibit people to congregate in indoor and outdoor places of amusement, sports or recreation.  | Health Protection Agency (DGPH);<br>HECC/DMSC; National Task Force             | Specific premises identified for closure closed within 12 hours of decision by National Task Force   |
| Consider movement restriction measures on islands and between islands  | Health Protection Agency (DGPH);<br>HECC/DMSC; National Task Force             | Movement restrictions enforced<br>within 12 hours of decision by<br>National Task Force  |
| Consider close of businesses with highrisk activity as determined based on the pandemic agent  | Health Protection Agency (DGPH);<br>HECC/DMSC; National Task Force             | High risk businesses closed within<br>12 hours of decision by National<br>Task Force   |
| Identify potentially vulnerable groups and enable the targeting communication, support and control interventions, as required.   | EOC case management workstreams;<br>CERT/NERF                                  | Residential locations of high-risk<br>groups identified within in 5 days<br>of institution of community level<br>restrictions and reached within 48<br>hours of identification |
| Implement intensive, targeted cluster control activities and other programmes in higher risk populations and settings such as hospitals, prison, rehabilitation centers, and state care homes. | EOC case management workstreams; CRT/NERT; Prisons, rehabs, state care homes   | IPC, symptom monitoring and notification practiced in all highrisk settings and weekly reports shared with EOC   |
| Protect unaffected islands with mandatory preventive measures for those who need to travel to those islands for essential services and establish movement monitoring mechanism at all islands  | EOC workstreams; CRT/NERT; island taskforces, local councils                   | Movement approval and monitoring mechanism in place within 24 hours of enforcing travel restrictions between islands   |

| Action  | Responsible agencies   | Target   |
|---|--|--|
| Activate shelter and relief support in islands with movement restrictions for migrants and travelers without permanent shelter and income | EOC workstreams; CRT/NERT; MRC   | Shelter and relief centers and service points designated and provide support within 24 hours of enforcing movement control |
| If not already activated, activate additional help lines on psychosocial support; social support and protection; income support           | EOC workstreams; CRT/NERT; sectoral work streams                                 | psychosocial helpline and social<br>support helpline activated within<br>24 hours of enforcing movement<br>control         |
| Call for volunteers from professional associations and civil society organizations to support cluster control responses.                  | EOC case management workstreams; CRT/NERT; CSOs                                  | Volunteer roster updated and volunteers mobilized to response as required  |
| Establish a system to permit movement for essential services and monitor movement when population wide restrictions are implemented       | Maldives Police Force; EOC enforcement workstream; local councils                | Permit system established within 24 hours of enforcing movement control  |
| Enforce mandatory public health interventions in force and monitor compliance   | Maldives Police Force; EOC enforcement and inspection workstream; local councils | Enforcement within 24 hours of enforcing movement control and compliance monitoring imitated within 10 days                |
| Implement burial procedures as per determined protocols with IPC  | EOC case management workstreams;<br>CRT/NERT; local councils                     | Burial procedures tested and protocols updated   |
| Commence immunization with AEFI monitoring once vaccine is deployed.  | EOC vaccination workstreams;<br>Health care providers                            | Immunization commenced as determine in deployment plan   |



| Action   | Responsible agencies                                      | Target   |
|--|---|--|
| Coordinate communications with other governments and international agencies about the situation in the country.  | Ministry of Health; EOC communications work stream; media | Daily updates and weekly<br>summaries shared with all<br>institutions and sectors and made<br>available pandemic webpage |
| Hold daily press briefing on situation on response led by the spokesperson   | Ministry of Health; EOC communications work stream; media | Daily press held   |
| Implement a multi-media and multi- method and multi-lingual risk communication campaign fronted by a trusted spokesperson and supported by all sectors and experts | Ministry of Health; EOC communications work stream; media | Risk communication campaign launched with daily messaging  |
| Address misinformation and redirect to authentic sources   | Ministry of Health; EOC communications work stream; media | Daily press held   |

| Action  | Responsible agencies  | Target  |
|---|---|---|
| Initiate text messaging to mobile phone numbers through providers to disseminate key messages   | Ministry of Health; EOC communications work stream; telecom regulator and providers | Text messaging initiated with weekly messaging to registered mobile numbers   |
| Prepare material that is customized and uses appropriate channels to reach populations who may be more susceptible, such as foreign migrants, blind and deaf, low literacy/illiterate | Ministry of Health; EOC<br>communications work stream;<br>media                     | Messaging of risk communication campaign customized to specific groups such as foreign migrants, blind and deaf and elderly                               |
| Expand the capacity of telephone helplines to meet an increase in demand from the public  | Ministry of Health; EOC communications work stream; call center                     | Additional human resources<br>and lines mobilized to meet call<br>demand to meet less than 5%<br>unattended calls   |
| Distribute situation reports and response summaries.  | Ministry of Health; EOC communications work stream                                  | Situation and response summaries updated weekly and published on pandemic website   |
| Provide customized information to specific population groups such as migrants, tourists and other visitors, elderly, PWDs in the country  | Ministry of Health; EOC communications work stream; tourism and foreign ministry    | Customized information prepared for tourists and travelers made available on tourism, foreign ministry and immigration websites                           |
| Maintain pandemic website with information on situation, guidelines and response actions  | Ministry of Health; EOC<br>communications work stream and<br>other workstreams      | Pandemic website updated daily<br>and updated versions of technical<br>material, guidelines and response<br>information available to public               |
| Update pandemic dashboard with Realtime data and updates  | Ministry of Health; EOC<br>communications and surveillance<br>workstreams           | Dashboard containing statistics of disease and epidemiological parameters, testing, quarantine and isolation and (vaccination if available) updated daily |
| Document response operations through documentaries, and reports   | Ministry of Health; EOC communications  | Response operations documented and updated weekly and video of operations made and update monthly   |
| Plan for vaccination awareness campaign   | Ministry of Health; EOC<br>communications and surveillance<br>workstreams           | Communication strategy for vaccination drafted within 14 days of ordering vaccine   |



| Action   | Responsible agencies                         | Target  |
|--|--|---|
| Continue to brief staff, cluster heads<br>and key decision-makers on a daily<br>basis  | EOC director; Operations Incident<br>Command | Daily huddle of EOC cluster heads,<br>HECC/DMSC meetings  |
| Maintain ToRs for each EOC cluster and update as response escalates  | EOC director; Operations Incident<br>Command | ToRs updated and clusters oriented within 24 hours of EOC activation  |
| Update and maintain workflow and communications flow for each cluster and at EOC reflecting changes with escalation of response  | EOC director; Operations Incident<br>Command | Workflow and communication<br>flow charts updated and EOC<br>clusters updated within 48 hours<br>of EOC activation  |
| Orient cluster heads and other responders on the use of pandemic information management system (outbreak system)   | EOC director; Operations Incident<br>Command | Orientation of EOC cluster head completed within 48 hours of EOC activation and all other EOC cluster responders oriented on the use of outbreak system within 10days |
| Keep up to date with national policy<br>and advice issued by the National Task<br>force and Health Protection  | EOC director; Operations Incident<br>Command | Decisions of HECC/DMSC shared with EOC workstreams and other workstreams same day   |
| Lead response within the agency and with the sector they serve.  | EOC director; Operations Incident<br>Command | Representation of other sectors at HECC/DMSC lead the sector actions within their organizations   |
| Hold periodic orientation sessions for<br>all work streams and answer queries<br>from the relevant sector, particularly<br>for new responders joining the<br>workstreams | EOC director; Operations Incident<br>Command | Regular (minimum weekly)<br>sessions for all EOC and other<br>workstreams to share updates and<br>changes in response operations                                      |
| Maintain record of all resources and update on a weekly basis  | EOC director; Operations Incident<br>Command | Record of resources (human,<br>material and financial) update<br>weekly   |
| Ensure established procedures are followed for procurement and release of resources  | EOC director; Operations Incident<br>Command | Record of paperwork reviewed and updated weekly   |
| Maintain coordination with other agencies through established national and atoll mechanisms.   | EOC director; Operations Incident<br>Command | Hold weekly operations meeting with atoll taskforces and other agencies from the activation of EOC  |
| Ensure established procedures are followed for procurement and release of resources  | EOC director; Operations Incident<br>Command | Maintain an update contact<br>details of focal points for each<br>sector available to all EOC and<br>workstream heads   |
| Provide security and protection for responders   | EOC director; Operations Incident<br>Command | Round the clock security for EOC established from the time of activation of EOC   |

| Action  | Responsible agencies                         | Target  |
|---|--|---|
| Provide alternative accommodations for frontline responders   | EOC director; Operations Incident<br>Command | Alternative accommodation<br>arrangements made for first<br>responders within 48 hours<br>decision y National Task Force                |
| Maintain ToRs for each EOC cluster and update as response escalates   | EOC director; Operations Incident<br>Command | ToRs updated and clusters oriented within 24 hours of EOC activation  |
| Maintain hygiene and IPC at EOC   | EOC director; Operations Incident<br>Command | EOC cleaning and IPC measures monitored twice daily   |
| Identify place for disinfection of vehicles used by rapid response teams and movement of suspected or confirmed cases | EOC director; Operations Incident<br>Command | Place identified for disinfection of vehicles used in response  |
| Maintain stock for EOC operations   | EOC director; Operations Incident<br>Command | Stock records reviewed and tallied weekly   |
| Maintain internet and telecommunications connectivity throughout the operations                                       | EOC director; Operations Incident<br>Command | Telephone connections and internet connections functional round the clock and downtime minimized to less than 2 hrs on any occasion     |
| Maintain functionality of the Outbreak system and have onsite trouble shooting arrangements                           | EOC director; Operations Incident<br>Command | Outbreak system functioning and downtime minimized to less than 2 hrs on any occasion   |
| Have mechanism to mobilise communication and technology resources as required to expand EOC functions                 | EOC director; Operations Incident<br>Command | Adequate computers, telephones and other devices available for operations from the  |
| Have vehicles and vessels operational with regular repair and maintenance   | EOC director; Operations Incident<br>Command | Vessels and vehicles checked weekly for repair needs  |
| Have access to food and water, and facilities for personal hygiene at EOC   | EOC director; Operations Incident<br>Command | Meals made available for Eco<br>responders and drinking water,<br>toilet facilities and prayer rooms<br>available for responders at EOC |
| Ensure response staff are given the opportunity for rest and recuperation and provide psychosocial support.           | EOC director; Operations Incident<br>Command | Mandatory daily breaks and fortnightly off hours implemented for all responders   |
| Ensure response staff are given the opportunity for rest and recuperation and provide psychosocial support.           | EOC director; Operations Incident<br>Command | Mandatory daily breaks and fortnightly off hours implemented for all responders   |

# Respond to Surge phase: Pandemic management (local alert level 4: RED)

Trigger: Multiple clusters at separate locations, or clusters spreading out of control in the country and recommendations of the national risk assessment (corresponds to the Global Pandemic phase)

Strategy: Minimize mortality and morbidity; Relief and protection provided; Maintain societal functioning to provide for basic needs and other emergencies

#### Function Planning and coordination

| Action  | Responsible agencies                                    | Target   |
|---|---|--|
| Review actions and decisions and adjust to the current situation.   | EOC planning workstream;<br>HECC/DMSC                   | Actions reviewed with evidence from situation updates and endorsed by National Task force  |
| Provide information from surveillance and epidemiological analysis and national/ subnational risk assessment to informs policy and operational decisions for escalation of response at national, atolls and island levels | Ministry of Health; EOC planning workstream             | Share regular updates (as determined by HECC/DMSC) on situation and response with HECC/DMSC and National task force                          |
| Operationalise additional hospital beds with human resources to respond to surge  | Ministry of Health; EOC planning work stream; HECC/DMSC | Temporary medical care facility constructed within one month of decision   |
| Downsize regular health services if required to mobilise health care reassures to respond to surge  | Ministry of Health; EOC planning workstream             | Regular health care downsized as determined by Ministry of Health  |
| Plan to operationalise mobile medical clinic to reach people living in communal setting including migrants  | Ministry of Health; EOC planning workstream             | Mobile medical clinics ready to be deployed  |
| Plan for decongestion of communal living areas by activating additional quarantine and isolation facilities, particularly for foreign migrant workers   | Ministry of Health; EOC planning workstream             | Places for decongestion identified and temporary shelter locations prepared as determined by HECC/DMSC decision                              |
| Mobilise human and other resource to ensure<br>the EOC is adequately resourced for the<br>increase in demand of surge   | Ministry of Health; EOC planning workstream             | human resource mobilization initiated with decision to commission additional hospital beds   |
| Define ethical basis and prioritisation criteria in providing health care for the affected populations and communicate to public  | Ministry of Health; TAC                                 | Ethical principles and prioritisation criteria finalised within 48 hours of triggering the Surge phase and communication to public initiated |

| Action  | Responsible agencies  | Target  |
|---|---|---|
| Report on the case load on healthcare workers and response capacity of the health system  | Ministry of Health; EOC planning work stream  | Health system capacity report presented to HECC/DMSC weekly or as determine by HECC/DMSC                          |
| Monitor use of PPE, medical and laboratory supplies and ensure availability of buffer stock   | Ministry of Health; EOC planning work stream  | Weekly update of medical supplies stock presented to HECC/DMSC  |
| Distribute supplies as per national prioritisation criteria and monitor usage of critical goods and services that may be in short supply.         | Ministry of Health; EOC planning work stream  | Essential goods and services distributed as per determined criteria and monitored weekly                          |
| Review and update testing strategy and identify resources for expanding testing logistics   | Ministry of Health; EOC planning work stream  | Testing strategy updated and logistics requirements presented to HECC/DMSC  |
| Continue to ensure provision of essential non-pandemic health care including online and digital platforms   | Ministry of Health; EOC planning work stream  | Weekly updates of any concerns in access to regular essential health care   |
| Activate provision of shelter and socio-<br>economic support  | All institutions, EOC planning work stream; HECC/DMSC   | Shelter provided to all displaced persons and socio-economic support initiated                                    |
| Conduct health and socioeconomic research into the pandemic situation and forecast its progression and impact                                     | All institutions; EOC planning workstream Universities;   | Epidemiological, health and socio- economic impact assessed and disseminated for planning mitigation and recovery |
| Review plans for Ease and scaling<br>down operations and strategy to<br>increase response capacity with<br>Resurgence                             | Ministry of Health; EOC planning work stream  | Ease plans and triggers reviewed and updated saturation is reached for the first wave reach                       |
| Start planning for recovery phase   | All institutions; EOC planning workstream Universities;   | Recovery planning group convened, and work initiated  |
| Prepare to order vaccines (if not done) and for vaccine logistics including cold changing monitoring, deployment and monitoring of adverse events | Ministry of Health; EOC planning<br>work stream; National immunisation<br>Programme, Maldives Food and Drug<br>Authority; Health care providers | Vaccine cold rooms and cold chain capacity increased prior to arrival of vaccine in the country                   |



| Action  | Responsible agencies   | Target  |
|---|--|---|
| Review the emphasis in surveillance activities to extensive assessment of the general spread, the health and social impacts of the pandemic, and the efficacy of control measures.          | Health Protection Agency; EOC surveillance workstream                      | Surveillance strategy reviewed and updated with early indication of escalation of cases         |
| Conduct epidemiological and response analysis and forecasts to informs policy and operational decisions for escalation of response at national, atolls and island levels                    | Health Protection Agency; EOC surveillance workstream                      | Weekly and monthly epidemiological analysis produced and updates made available to EOC clusters |
| Update case investigation and contract tracing guidelines based on emerging evidence and local situation  | Health Protection Agency; EOC surveillance and case management workstreams | SOPs/Guidelines updated within 48 hours of triggering the phase                                 |
| Implement targeted surveillance programmes in higher-risk settings (prison, rehabs, state care homes, airports, industrial and new construction sites) and in vulnerable population groups. | Health Protection Agency; EOC surveillance workstream; sector work streams | Fortnightly surveillance conducted at high-risk locations and premised                          |
| Continue to attend to reports of cases with symptoms from calls made to hotline and verify for case investigation   | Health Protection Agency; Call center;<br>EOC surveillance workstream      | All cases with repots of symptoms verified within 48 hours of receiving the call                |
| Monitor notifiable disease reporting from health centers and hospitals disease notification in addition to the pandemic agent notifications   | Health Protection Agency; EOC surveillance workstream                      | Weekly notifiable disease reporting analysed  |
| Monitor mortality data for the pandemic disease and other causes to inform further actions  | Health Protection Agency; Ministry of Health; EOC surveillance workstream  | Weekly mortality data analysed  |
| Conduct periodic laboratory analysis of virus characteristics and collaborate internationally for gene sequencing to monitor circulating virus strains                                      | Health Protection Agency; EOC surveillance and laboratory workstream       | Virus characteristics analysed and virus strain monitored every 2 months                        |
| Continue to monitor situation internationally   | Health Protection Agency; EOC surveillance workstream                      | Daily monitored and weekly summaries produced   |
| Produce summaries for epidemic islands with community transmission  | Health Protection Agency; EOC surveillance workstream                      | Epidemic summaries produced   |



| Action   | Responsible agencies  | Target  |
|--|---|---|
| Review border measures and take appropriate interventions  | Health Protection Agency; HECC/<br>DMSC   | Border measures review in view of the situation and updated   |
| Review and update health criteria for travelers leaving the country and exit assessment procedures for travelers, based on the country situation and risk of exporting in line with WHO guidance and IHR requirements and share with HECC/DMSC and all agencies and public | Health Protection Agency; EOC<br>surveillance workstream, border<br>health work stream; Tourism and<br>Foreign ministries | Health requirement for departure<br>form Maldives determined and<br>shared with HECC/DMSC/National<br>Taskforce and the public      |
| Continue to do contact tracing, mandatory quarantine of contacts and isolation of suspected cases and testing as required and provide advice to contacts on social distancing and symptoms   | Health Protection Agency; EOC surveillance workstream, border health work stream; Tourism and Foreign ministries          | Contact tracing conducted and traveller isolated within 24 hours of notification  |
| Ensure those in quarantine and isolation can access food, medications and treatment for existing conditions, and are referred to welfare agencies for social support needs.  | Health Protection Agency; EOC surveillance workstream, border health work stream; Tourism and Foreign ministries          | Food and essential commodities provided to travelers in quarantine and psychosocial support provided while in quarantine            |
| Continue surveillance of travelers entering the country with health declaration, requirement for additional evidence of laboratory test, and temperature monitoring at air and seaports  | Health Protection Agency; EOC surveillance workstream, border health work stream  | Updated health declaration forms implemented at sea and airports with temperature monitoring with 24 hours of decision by HECC/DMSC |
| Impalement IPC and other public health measures at ports   | Health Protection Agency; EOC surveillance workstream, border health work stream  | IPC measures determined by HPA implemented at airports  |
| Maintain facilities for assessment and taking samples for testing and temporary isolation at airports  | Health Protection Agency; EOC surveillance workstream, border health work stream  | Temporary quarantine and isolation facilities maintained at airports  |
| Impalement IPC and other public health measures at ports   | Health Protection Agency; EOC<br>surveillance workstream, border<br>health work stream                                    | IPC measures determined by HPA implemented at airports  |



### Function Preparedness and control interventions

| Action  | Responsible agencies   | Target   |
|---|--|--|
| Continue to monitor health of contacts and suspected cases while at home in quarantine and/or isolation and assess psychosocial needs   | EOC case management workstreams; CERT/NERF; CMAT                                   | All contacts and cases at home contacted once of alternate days to assess health and needs                               |
| Continue isolation of cases and treat according to clinical advice and guidelines.  | EOC case management workstreams;<br>CMAT; Healthcare providers                     | Cases meeting clinical monitoring moved to isolation facilities and/or designated hospital for observation and treatment |
| Continue to monitor health status of health care workers, assess and report to EOC for case investigation   | Health care providers; EOC case management workstreams                             | Weekly updates of healthcare<br>workers affected reported to EOC   |
| Test suspect cases, using the PCR test/<br>other recommended tests; test cases in<br>the community or in a<br>hospital when clinically indicated;<br>provide information to suspect cases<br>by telephone/applications. | EOC case management workstreams;<br>laboratory work stream; CERT/NERF              | All suspected cases tested at defined period   |
| Continue arrangements for sample transfer across islands to the testing laboratories  | EOC case management<br>workstreams; laboratory work<br>stream; CERT/NERF           | Samples transferred as per protocols for labelling and packaging for testing within 48 hours of sample collection        |
| Designate more laboratories for testing for the operations  | EOC case management workstreams;<br>laboratory work stream; CERT/NERF              | Additional laboratories in the private sector or state institutions designated for pandemic response                     |
| Continue arrangements for sample transfer across islands to the testing laboratories  | EOC case management<br>workstreams; laboratory work<br>stream; CERT/NERF           | Samples transferred as per protocols for labelling and packaging for testing within 48 hours of sample collection        |
| Increase number of flu clinics for assessment of suspected cases  | EOC case management workstreams;<br>health care providers                          | At least one flu clinics established on islands with cases   |
| Continue to provide psychosocial support and mental health care and mobilize additional support from private health sector  | EOC case management workstreams; CERT/NERF; National center for mental health; MRC | Psychosocial support calls attended with less than 5% unattended calls   |
| Update quarantine, isolation and IPC guidelines based on emerging evidence and local situation  | Health Protection Agency; EOC surveillance and case management workstreams         | SOPs/Guidelines updated within 48 hours of triggering each phase   |
| Mobilize additional ambulance services from private health sectors for emergency transfer of patients (pandemic disease and other medical emergencies)  | EOC case management workstreams; CRT/NERT; EMS                                     | EMS activated to provide emergency transfer of severe cases to designated hospitals                                      |

| Action  | Responsible agencies  | Target   |
|---|---|--|
| Continue to provide essential medical care through mobile medical response team to those at home in quarantine/ isolation or otherwise requiring medical assessment in movement control areas             | EOC case management workstreams; CERT/NERF; Health care professional Associations   | Mobile medical response teams provide online consultations to all calls to hotline with medical problems and provide home visits as required |
| Monitor phone/online application to enable people to contact EOC for reporting symptoms, receiving test results, and documentation on quarantine, de-isolation, recovery and travel                       | EOC information technology workstream; EOC other workstreams                        | Online application (e.g.<br>Haalubelun used in Covid19<br>pandemic) available  |
| Enforce quarantine and isolation of contacts, suspected cases and cases as per the latest criteria/guideline.   | EOC case management workstreams; CERT/NERf; local councils                          | Quarantine and isolation enforced within 24 hours of notification  |
| Close educational facilities and other establishments where large number of periods longer than those determined by Health Protection Agency and activate online teaching                                 | Health Protection Agency (DGPH);<br>HECC/DMSC; National Task Force                  | Educational facilities and other<br>establishments closed within 12<br>hours of decision by National Task<br>Force                           |
| close specific premises and prohibit people to congregate in indoor and outdoor places of amusement, sports or recreation.  | Health Protection Agency (DGPH);<br>HECC/DMSC; National Task Force                  | Specific premises identified for<br>closure closed within 12 hours of<br>decision by National Task Force                                     |
| Implement movement restriction measures on islands and between islands  | Health Protection Agency (DGPH);<br>HECC/DMSC; National Task Force                  | Movement restrictions enforced<br>within 12 hours of decision by<br>National Task Force  |
| Close of businesses with high-risk activity as determined based on the pandemic agent   | Health Protection Agency (DGPH);<br>HECC/DMSC; National Task Force                  | High risk businesses closed within<br>12 hours of decision by National<br>Task Force   |
| Continue intensive, targeted cluster control activities and other programmes in higher risk populations and settings such as hospitals, prison, rehabilitation centers, and state care homes.             | EOC case management workstreams;<br>CERT/NERF; Prisons, rehabs, state care<br>homes | IPC, symptom monitoring and notification practiced in all highrisk settings and weekly reports shared with EOC                               |
| Continue to protect unaffected islands with mandatory preventive measures for those who need to travel to those islands for essential services and establish movement monitoring mechanism at all islands | EOC workstreams; CERT/NERF; island taskforces, local councils                       | Movement approval and monitoring mechanism in place within 24 hours of enforcing travel restrictions between islands                         |
| Provide shelter and relief support in islands with movement restrictions for migrants and travelers without permanent shelter and income  | EOC workstreams; CERT/NERF; MRC   | Shelter and relief centers and<br>service points designated and<br>provide support within 24 hours<br>of enforcing movement control          |

| Action  | Responsible agencies   | Target   |
|---|--|--|
| Upscale operations of help lines on psychosocial support; social support and protection; income support   | EOC workstreams; CERT/NERF; sectoral work streams                                | psychosocial helpline and social<br>support helpline activated within<br>24 hours of enforcing movement<br>control   |
| Mobilise volunteers from professional associations and civil society organizations to support cluster control responses.                                    | EOC case management workstreams;<br>CRT/NERT; CSOs                               | Volunteer roster updated and volunteers mobilized to response as required  |
| Continue to implement permit-based movement for essential services and monitor movement   | Maldives Police Force; EOC<br>enforcement workstream; local<br>councils          | Permit system established within 24 hours of enforcing movement control  |
| Enforce mandatory public health interventions in force and monitor compliance Enforce mandatory public health interventions in force and monitor compliance | Maldives Police Force; EOC enforcement and inspection workstream; local councils | Enforcement within 24 hours of<br>enforcing movement control and<br>compliance monitoring imitated<br>within 10 days |
| Implement burial procedures as per determined protocols with IPV  | EOC case management workstreams; CERT/NERF T; local councils                     | Burial procedures reviewed and protocols updated   |
| Commence immunization with AEFI monitoring once the vaccine is deployed.  | EOC vaccination workstreams; Health care providers                               | Immunization commenced as determined in the deployment plan  |



| Action   | Responsible agencies  | Target   |
|--|---|--|
| Coordinate communications with other governments and international agencies about the situation in the country.      | Ministry of Health; EOC communications work stream; media                           | Daily updates and weekly<br>summaries shared with all<br>institutions and sectors and<br>made available on the pandemic<br>webpage |
| Hold daily press briefing on the current situation and the response activities; this will be led by the spokesperson | Ministry of Health; EOC communications work stream; media                           | Daily press briefing held  |
| Update the focus of the media campaign based on media monitoring reports and response decisions                      | Ministry of Health; EOC communications work stream; media                           | Risk communication campaign launched with daily messaging  |
| Address misinformation and redirect to authentic sources   | Ministry of Health; EOC communications work stream; media                           | Media and social media<br>monitored and daily updates<br>provided to spokesperson  |
| Initiate text messaging to mobile phone numbers through providers to disseminate key messages                        | Ministry of Health; EOC communications work stream; telecom regulator and providers | Text messaging imitated with weekly messaging to registered mobile numbers   |

| Action  | Responsible agencies   | Target  |
|---|--|---|
| Prepare material that is customized and uses appropriate channels to reach populations who may be more susceptible, such as foreign migrants, blind and deaf, low literacy/illiterate | Ministry of Health; EOC<br>communications work stream;<br>media                  | Messaging of risk communication campaign customized to specific groups such as foreign migrants, blind and deaf and elderly   |
| Expand the capacity of telephone helplines to meet an increase in demand from the public  | Ministry of Health; EOC communications work stream; call center                  | Additional human resources<br>and lines mobilized to meet call<br>demand to meet less than 5%<br>unattended calls   |
| Distribute situation reports and response summaries.  | Ministry of Health; EOC communications work stream                               | Situation and response summaries updated weekly and published on pandemic website   |
| Provide customized information to tourists and other visitors in the country  | Ministry of Health; EOC communications work stream; tourism and foreign ministry | Customized information prepared<br>for tourists and travelers made<br>available on tourism, foreign<br>ministry, Civil Aviation Authority<br>and immigration websites |
| Maintain pandemic website with information on situation, guidelines and response actions  | Ministry of Health; EOC communications work stream and other workstreams         | Pandemic website updated daily<br>and updated versions of technical<br>material, guidelines and response<br>information available to public                           |
| Update pandemic dashboard with<br>Realtime data and updates   | Ministry of Health; EOC<br>communications and surveillance<br>workstreams        | Dashboard containing statistics of disease and epidemiological parameters, testing, quarantine and isolation and (vaccination if available) updated daily             |
| Prepare for vaccination awareness campaign  | Ministry of Health; EOC<br>communications and surveillance<br>workstreams        | started developing messages<br>and materials for vaccination<br>campaign  |



| Action  | Responsible agencies                         | Target   |
|---|--|--|
| Continue to brief staff, cluster heads and key decision-makers on a daily basis   | EOC director; Operations Incident<br>Command | Daily huddle of EOC cluster heads,<br>HECC/DMSC meetings   |
| Maintain ToRs for each EOC cluster and update as response escalates   | EOC director; Operations Incident<br>Command | ToRs updated and clusters oriented within 24 hours of EOC activation   |
| Update and maintain workflow and communications flow for each cluster and at EOC reflecting changes with escalation of response | EOC director; Operations Incident<br>Command | Workflow and communication<br>flow charts updated and EOC<br>clusters updated within 48 hours<br>of EOC activation |

| Action   | Responsible agencies                         | Target  |
|--|--|---|
| Orient cluster heads and other responders on the use of pandemic information management system (outbreak system)   | EOC director; Operations Incident<br>Command | Orientation of EOC cluster head completed within 48 hours of EOC activation and all other EOC cluster responders oriented on the use of outbreak system within 10days |
| Keep up to date with national policy<br>and advice issued by the National Task<br>force and Health Protection Agency   | EOC director; Operations Incident<br>Command | Decisions of HECC/DMSC shared with EOC workstreams and other workstreams same day   |
| Keep up to date with national policy<br>and advice issued by the National Task<br>force and Health Protection Agency   | EOC director; Operations Incident<br>Command | Decisions of HECC/DMSC shared with EOC workstreams and other workstreams same day   |
| Lead response within the agency and with the sector they serve.  | EOC director; Operations Incident<br>Command | Representation of other sectors at HECC/DMSC lead the sector actions within their organizations   |
| Hold periodic orientation sessions for<br>all work streams and answer queries<br>from the relevant sector, particularly<br>for new responders joining the<br>workstreams | EOC director; Operations Incident<br>Command | Regular (minimum weekly)<br>sessions for all EOC and other<br>workstreams to share updates<br>and changes in response<br>operations                                   |
| Maintain record of all resources and update on a weekly basis  | EOC director; Operations Incident<br>Command | Record of resources (human, material and financial) update weekly   |
| Ensure established procedures are followed for procurement and release of resources  | EOC director; Operations Incident<br>Command | Record of paperwork reviewed and updated weekly   |
| Maintain coordination with other agencies through established national and atoll mechanisms.   | EOC director; Operations Incident<br>Command | Hold weekly operations meeting with atoll task forces and other agencies from the activation of EOC   |
| Ensure each agency's single point of contact details are disseminated to other agencies.   | EOC director; Operations Incident<br>Command | Maintain an update contact<br>details of focal points for each<br>sector available to all EOC and<br>workstream heads   |
| Provide security and protection for responders   | EOC director; Operations Incident<br>Command | Round the clock security for EOC established from the time of activation of EOC   |
| Provide alternative accommodations for frontline responders  | EOC director; Operations Incident<br>Command | Alternative accommodation<br>arrangements made for first<br>responders within 48 hours<br>decision y National Task Force  |
| Maintain hygiene and IPC at EOC  | EOC director; Operations Incident<br>Command | EOC cleaning and IPC measures monitored twice daily   |

| Action  | Responsible agencies                         | Target  |
|---|--|---|
| Identify place for disinfection of vehicles used by rapid response teams and movement of suspected or confirmed cases | EOC director; Operations Incident<br>Command | Place identified for disinfection of vehicles used in response  |
| Maintain stock for EOC operations   | EOC director; Operations Incident<br>Command | Stock records reviewed and tallied weekly   |
| Maintain internet and telecommunications connectivity throughout the operations                                       | EOC director; Operations Incident<br>Command | Telephone connections and internet connections functional round the clock and downtime minimized to less than 2 hrs on any occasion     |
| Maintain functionality of the<br>Outbreak system and have onsite<br>troubleshooting arrangements                      | EOC director; Operations Incident<br>Command | Outbreak system functioning and downtime minimized to less than 2 hrs on any occasion   |
| Maintain communication and technology resources as required to expand EOC functions                                   | EOC director; Operations Incident<br>Command | Adequate computers, telephones and other devices available for operations from the  |
| Have vehicles and vessels operational with regular repair and maintenance   | EOC director; Operations Incident<br>Command | Vessels and vehicles checked weekly for repair needs  |
| Have access to food and water, and facilities for personal hygiene at EOC   | EOC director; Operations Incident<br>Command | Meals made available for Eco<br>responders and drinking water,<br>toilet facilities and prayer rooms<br>available for responders at EOC |
| Ensure response staff are given the opportunity for rest, recuperation and make available psychosocial support.       | EOC director; Operations Incident<br>Command | Mandatory daily breaks and fortnightly off hours implemented for all responders   |

## Ease and Resurgence Phase: Post-peak transition (local alert level 3: ORANGE)

Trigger: Wave(s) decreasing in the country and the recommendations of the national risk assessment (corresponds to Global Pandemic phase and/or Transition phase)

Strategy: Recovery expedited; Re-escalation operations planned; Monitoring mechanism in place

## Function Planning and coordination

| Action  | Responsible agencies                         | Target  |
|---|--|---|
| Inform agencies of the change in phase based on national risk assessment.   | EOC planning workstream;<br>HECC/DMSC        | All sectors informed of the change in the phase within 24 hours of decision by HECC/DMSC                      |
| Review actions and decisions and adjust disease control measures consistent with the situation in a staggered and phased manner | EOC planning workstream;<br>HECC/DMSC        | Actions reviewed with evidence from situation updates and endorsed by National Task force                     |
| Estimate standby resource requirements for a resurgence based on surveillance and epidemiological estimations                   | Ministry of Health; EOC planning work stream | Estimates on standby resource requirements completed and shared with HECC prior to initiation of scale down   |
| Initiate transition of emergency management structures (if DMSC was activated scale down to HECC) to an ease phase              | Ministry of Health; EOC planning work stream | Scale down initiated within 24 hours of decision by National Taskforce  |
| Initiate scale down of operations with clear triggers for scale up if resurgence  | Ministry of Health; EOC planning work stream | EOC operations scaled down with standby of human and material resources in case of resurgence                 |
| Report on the epidemiological situation and monitoring indicators   | Ministry of Health; EOC planning work stream | Situation presented to HECC/<br>DMSC weekly or as determined<br>by HECC/DMSC                                  |
| Prepare for a longer pandemic phase with strategies for initialisation and continuation of response                             | Ministry of Health; EOC planning work stream | Medium term operations strategy<br>and institutional plan developed<br>and shared with National Task<br>Force |
| Make decisions to re-introduced control interventions at short notice if there is a resurgence.                                 | Ministry of Health; EOC planning work stream | Re-introduce control interventions with the early indication of resurgence                                    |

| Action  | Responsible agencies   | Target   |
|---|--|--|
| Debrief staff and agencies, and collate lessons learned in order to better inform planning and future responses.  | Ministry of Health; All institutions and sectors                   | Lessons learnt documented and shared with all sectors  |
| Evaluate the effectiveness of measures used and update plans, guidelines, protocols and algorithms accordingly.   | Ministry of Health; All EOC<br>workstreams and sector work streams | Evaluations documented and shared with all sectors to update protocols and workflow                |
| Conduct health and socioeconomic research into the pandemic situation and forecast its progression and impact   | All institutions; EOC planning workstream Universities;            | Health and socio-economic impact assessed and disseminated for prioritising recovery interventions |
| Compile report on lessons learned in the country health and intersectoral response in order to inform planning and future responses, using an evaluation framework. | Ministry of Health; All institutions and sectors                   | Response report documented and shared with all sectors   |
| Collate resources and store material developed in the response for use in future pandemics.   | Ministry of Health; All institutions and sectors                   | Resources collected and stored at respective sectors   |
| Prepare for the recovery phase coordination and plan for recovery and resilience  | Ministry of Health; All institutions and sectors                   | Recovery planning initiated  |
| Review the ongoing need for the declared Public Health Emergency and consider removal of the declaration  | Director General of Public Health                                  | Decision on continuation of the public health emergency made and reviewed periodically             |
| Plan to resume full health services   | Ministry of Health, Healthcare providers                           | Regular health services resumed with the change in phase   |
| Coordinate with and provide situation updated to WHO and international agencies and other governments   | Ministry of Health, Ministry of<br>Foreign Affairs                 | Regular liaison with WHO and other countries   |
| Review usage of national reserves of essential supplies and consider reordering supplies.   | Ministry of Health; EOC planning work stream                       | Essential item usage reviewed and stock re-ordered as required for a national contingency stock    |



| Action   | Responsible agencies   | Target   |
|--|--|--|
| Review the emphasis in surveillance activities in order to focus activities on early detection of any resurgence.  | Health Protection Agency; EOC surveillance workstream                            | Surveillance strategy reviewed and updated with indicators for early detection of resurgence             |
| Conduct epidemiological analysis and forecasts to informs policy and operational decisions for scaling down and preparation for resurgence                               | Health Protection Agency; EOC surveillance workstream                            | Weekly and monthly<br>epidemiological analysis<br>produced and updates made<br>available to EOC clusters |
| Update national risk assessment with subnational disaggregation and provide recommendations to HECC  | Health Protection Agency; EOC surveillance workstream                            | Risk assessment presented to<br>HEOC within 24 hours of indication<br>of downward trend of the epidemic  |
| Update case investigation and contract tracing guidelines based on emerging evidence and local situation   | Health Protection Agency;<br>EOC surveillance and case<br>management workstreams | SOPs/Guidelines updated<br>within 48 hours of triggering the<br>phase                                    |
| Implement targeted surveillance programmes in higher-risk settings   | Health Protection Agency; EOC surveillance workstream; sector work streams       | Fortnightly surveillance conducted at high-risk settings   |
| Continue to attend to reports of cases with symptoms from calls made to hotline and verify for case investigation  | Health Protection Agency;<br>Call center; EOC surveillance<br>workstream         | All cases with repots of symptoms verified within 24 hours of receiving the call                         |
| Monitor notifiable disease reporting from health centers and hospitals disease notification in addition to the pandemic agent notifications                              | Health Protection Agency; EOC surveillance workstream                            | Weekly notifiable disease reporting analyzed   |
| Review mortality data for the pandemic disease and other causes to inform impact of response on the health system  | Health Protection Agency;<br>Ministry of Health; EOC<br>surveillance workstream  | Mortality data analyzed for pandemic and non-pandemic diseases   |
| Conduct periodic laboratory analysis of virus characteristics and collaborate internationally for gene sequencing to monitor circulating virus strains                   | Health Protection Agency; EOC surveillance and laboratory workstream             | Virus characteristics analysed and virus strain monitored every 2 months                                 |
| Monitor vaccination coverage and assess vaccine efficacy and effectiveness   | Health Protection Agency; EOC surveillance workstream                            | Vaccination coverage monitored weekly and analysed with epidemic progression                             |
| Continue to monitor situation internationally to identify any changes in frequency and severity of the pandemic, emergence of variant of concern, and guidance from WHO. | Health Protection Agency; EOC surveillance workstream                            | Daily monitored and weekly summaries produced  |
| Produce epidemic summaries for specific clusters and islands.  | Health Protection Agency; EOC surveillance workstream                            | Epidemic summaries produced for the community transmission islands                                       |



| Action   | Responsible agencies  | Target  |
|--|---|---|
| Review border measures and take appropriate interventions based on emerging evidence   | Health Protection Agency; HECC/<br>DMSC   | Border measures review in view of the situation and updated   |
| Review and update health criteria and requirements for incoming travelers, based on the risk of importing the disease and virus strains in line with WHO guidance and IHR requirements     | Health Protection Agency; EOC<br>surveillance workstream, border<br>health work stream; Tourism and<br>Foreign ministries | Health requirement for entry to<br>Maldives determined and shared<br>with HECC/DMSC/National<br>Taskforce and the public            |
| Review the requirements for pratique of marine vessels in line with WHO guidance and IHR requirements  | Health Protection Agency; EOC<br>surveillance workstream, border<br>health work stream; Tourism and<br>Foreign ministries | Health requirement for pratique updated and shared with HECC/DMSC/National Taskforce and maritime operators                         |
| Continue to do contact tracing, mandatory quarantine of contacts and isolation of suspected cases and testing as required and provide advice to contacts on social distancing and symptoms | Health Protection Agency; EOC<br>surveillance workstream, border<br>health work stream; Tourism and<br>Foreign ministries | Contact tracing conducted and traveler isolated within 24 hours of notification   |
| Continue to do contact tracing, mandatory quarantine of contacts and isolation of suspected cases and testing as required and provide advice to contacts on social distancing and symptoms | Health Protection Agency; EOC<br>surveillance workstream, border<br>health work stream; Tourism and<br>Foreign ministries | Contact tracing conducted and traveler isolated within 24 hours of notification   |
| Continue surveillance of travelers entering the country with health declaration, requirement for additional evidence of laboratory test, and temperature monitoring at air and seaports    | Health Protection Agency; EOC<br>surveillance workstream, border<br>health work stream                                    | Updated health declaration forms implemented at sea and airports with temperature monitoring with 24 hours of decision by HECC/DMSC |
| Continue to impalement IPC and other public health measures at posts   | Health Protection Agency; EOC surveillance workstream, border health work stream  | IPC measures determined by HPA implemented at airports  |
| Maintain facilities for assessment and taking samples for testing and temporary isolation at airports  | Health Protection Agency; EOC<br>surveillance workstream, border<br>health work stream                                    | Temporary quarantine and isolation facilities maintained at airports  |



# Function Preparedness and control interventions

| Action   | Responsible agencies   | Target  |
|--|--|---|
| Re-evaluate measures that have been put in place and return to business with guidelines when justified.  | EOC workstreams; sectoral work streams   | Measures re-evaluated and decisions made to return to work with guidelines  |
| Prepare health facilities and implement programs to monitor and cater to those with long-lasting complications of the disease  | Ministry of Health; EOC case management workstream                               | Guidelines for identification of<br>complications produced and<br>health care professionals at all<br>levels oriented   |
| Continue or commence a pandemic vaccination programme, as required   | Ministry of Health; EOC workstreams  | Vaccination continued to reach coverage target set by HPA   |
| Prepare public health measures for educational establishments, resort and tourist establishments, café/restaurants and other workplaces that provide services to public and workplaces | Health Protection Agency;  | Prepare public health guidelines for educational establishments, resort and tourist establishments, café/restaurants and other workplaces that provide services to public and workplaces developed and made available on pandemic website |
| In a phased manner authorize opening of educational establishments, resort and tourist establishments, café/restaurants and other workplaces with public health guidelines             | Director General of Public Health;<br>National Task Force                        | Return to work and social activity implemented in phases  |
| In a phased manner authorize opening of educational establishments, resort and tourist establishments, café/restaurants and other workplaces with public health guidelines             | Director General of Public Health;<br>National Task Force                        | Return to work and social activity implemented in phases  |
| Monitor compliance to public health guidelines at workplaces and places providing services to public and enforce penalties for noncompliance   | Maldives Police Force; EOC enforcement and inspection workstream; local councils | Enforcement within 24 hours of<br>enforcing movement control and<br>compliance monitoring initiated<br>within 10 days   |
| Lift any internal travel restrictions and/or movement restrictions when justified in a phased manner   | Director General of Public Health;<br>National Task Force                        | When justified, travel and movement restrictions lifted   |
| Lift restrictions on public gatherings, when justified in a phased manner  | Director General of Public Health;<br>National Task Force                        | When justified, public gathering restrictions lifted  |
| Reinstate restrictions when justified by epidemiological situation   | Director General of Public Health;<br>National Task Force                        | When justified, restrictions reinstated   |
| Provide information and guidance to sectors return to business with safety precautions   | All sectors and institutions   | Sectors provided with guidance and information as required  |



| Action   | Responsible agencies  | Target  |
|--|---|---|
| Update the public and all sectors on any changes to the status of the pandemic (ongoing).  | Ministry of Health; EOC communications work stream                  | All sectors updated on the situation and decisions by HECC/eMusic   |
| Ensure the public and sectors are aware on the possibility of pandemic resurge or that a second wave will occur, and to remain ready for business continuity with control measures   | Ministry of Health; EOC communications work stream; media           | All sectors maintain readiness for resurgence   |
| Update communications strategy for re-opening awareness to maintain public alert (including migrants), for possible resurgence and use information on surveillance and response decisions, supported by media monitoring reports, (ongoing). | Ministry of Health; EOC<br>communications work stream               | Public made aware of the situation<br>and possible resurgence and the<br>need for practicing prevention<br>behaviours                                     |
| Evaluate and update risk communication messages, with special reference to audience segments (ongoing).  | Ministry of Health; EOC communications work stream                  | Messaging of risk communication campaign updated to the situation   |
| Disseminate updated public health guidelines for work places, services and other social and economic sectors   | Ministry of Health; EOC communications work stream                  | updated guidelines shared with sectors and made available on pandemic website   |
| Distribute situation reports and response summaries.   | Ministry of Health; EOC communications work stream                  | Situation and response summaries updated weekly and published on pandemic website   |
| Update pandemic dashboard with<br>Realtime data and updates  | Ministry of Health; EOC communications and surveillance workstreams | Dashboard containing statistics of disease and epidemiological parameters, testing, quarantine and isolation and (vaccination if available) updated daily |
| Initiate development of a behaviour change campaign for continued practice of prevention measures, posttrauma knowledge.   | Ministry of Health; EOC communications work stream, media           | Behaviour change communication<br>campaign launched with the<br>start of lifting of public health<br>measures   |
| Update messages on health requirements for travel to and from Maldives   | Ministry of Health; EOC communications work stream, media           | Updates messages on travel information available on immigration, tourism, foreign ministry and pandemic websites  |



| Action  | Responsible agencies                         | Target  |
|---|--|---|
| Continue to brief staff, cluster heads and key decision-makers on a daily basis   | EOC director; Operations Incident<br>Command | Daily huddle of EOC cluster heads,<br>HECC/DMSC meetings  |
| Scale down EOC clusters with standby<br>by of resources to quickly<br>escalate response in case of resurgence                   | EOC director; Operations Incident<br>Command | ToRs updated and clusters oriented within 24 hours of EOC activation  |
| Update and maintain workflow and communications flow for each cluster and at EOC reflecting changes with scale down of response | EOC director; Operations Incident<br>Command | Workflow and communication<br>flow charts updated and EOC<br>clusters updated within 48 hours<br>of EOC activation  |
| Re-orient cluster heads and other responders on the use of pandemic information management system (outbreak system)             | EOC director; Operations Incident<br>Command | Orientation of EOC cluster head completed within 48 hours of EOC activation and all other EOC cluster responders oriented on the use of outbreak system within 10days |
| Keep up to date with national policy<br>and advice issued by the National Task<br>force and Health Protection Agency            | EOC director; Operations Incident<br>Command | Decisions of HECC/DMSC shared with EOC workstreams and other workstreams same day   |
| Lead response within the agency and with the sector they serve.   | EOC director; Operations Incident<br>Command | Representation of other sectors at HECC/DMSC lead the sector actions within their organizations   |
| Hold periodic orientation sessions for all work streams and answer queries from the relevant sector                             | EOC director; Operations Incident<br>Command | Regular (minimum weekly)<br>sessions for all EOC and other<br>workstreams to share updates and<br>changes in response operations                                      |
| Maintain record of all resources and update on a weekly basis   | EOC director; Operations Incident<br>Command | Record of resources (human,<br>material and financial) update<br>weekly   |
| Ensure established procedures are followed for procurement and release of resources   | EOC director; Operations Incident<br>Command | Record of paperwork reviewed and updated weekly   |
| Maintain coordination with other agencies through established national and atoll mechanisms.                                    | EOC director; Operations Incident<br>Command | Hold weekly operations meeting with atoll taskforces and other agencies from the activation of EOC  |
| Ensure each agency's single point of contact details are up-to-date and disseminated to other agencies.                         | EOC director; Operations Incident<br>Command | Maintain an update contact details<br>of focal points for each sector<br>availed to all EOC and workstream<br>heads   |

| Action  | Responsible agencies                         | Target  |
|---|--|---|
| Continue to provide security and protection for responders  | EOC director; Operations Incident<br>Command | Round the clock security for EOC established from the time of activation of EOC   |
| Scale down alternative accommodations for frontline responders  | EOC director; Operations Incident<br>Command | Alternative accommodation<br>arrangements made for first<br>responders within 48 hours<br>decision y National Task Force              |
| Maintain hygiene and IPC at EOC   | EOC director; Operations Incident<br>Command | EOC cleaning and IPC measures monitored twice daily   |
| Maintain place for disinfection of vehicles used by rapid response teams and movement of suspected or confirmed cases | EOC director; Operations Incident<br>Command | Place identified for disinfection of vehicles used in response  |
| Maintain stock for EOC operations and re-stock contingency in preparation for possible resurgence                     | EOC director; Operations Incident<br>Command | Stock records reviewed and tallied weekly   |
| Maintain internet and telecommunications connectivity throughout the operations                                       | EOC director; Operations Incident<br>Command | Telephone connections and internet connections functional round the clock and downtime minimized to less than 2 hrs on any occasion   |
| Maintain functionality of the Outbreak system and have onsite trouble shooting arrangements                           | EOC director; Operations Incident<br>Command | Outbreak system functioning and downtime minimized to less than 2 hrs on any occasion   |
| Maintain communication and technology resources for EOC functions   | EOC director; Operations Incident<br>Command | Adequate computers, telephones and other devices availed for operations from the  |
| Scale down vehicles and vessels, repair and maintenance, and have contingency ready for mobilization                  | EOC director; Operations Incident<br>Command | Vessels and vehicles checked weekly for repair needs  |
| Have access to food and water, and facilities for personal hygiene at EOC   | EOC director; Operations Incident<br>Command | Meals made availed for Eco<br>responders and drinking water,<br>toilet facilities and prayer rooms<br>available for responders at EOC |
| Ensure response staff are given the opportunity for rest, recuperation and make available psychosocial support.       | EOC director; Operations Incident<br>Command | Mandatory daily breaks and fortnightly off hours implemented for all responders   |

# Recovery Phase: Recovery management (local alert level 2: YELLOW)

Trigger: Population protected by vaccination, or pandemic receding in the country and recommendation of the national risk assessment (corresponds to Global Pandemic phase and/or Transition phase)

Strategy: Funds and other resources mobilized; Return to near normal society; Social and economic recovery started

## Function Planning and coordination

| Action   | Responsible agencies                            | Target  |
|--|---|---|
| Review actions and decisions and develop phased plans for ceasing programmes introduced in earlier phases, starting or continuing recovery-specific programmes, and returning to business-as-usual activities. | Ministry of Health; National Task<br>Force      | Actions reviews and recovery plan developed   |
| Withdraw Public Health<br>Emergency notice when conditions are met   | Director General of Public Health               | Public Health Emergency notice taken down   |
| Deactivate, when appropriate, the HECC and EOC and other emergency operations  | Ministry of Health; National Task<br>Force      | Decision made to deactivate HECC and EOC  |
| Coordinate with and provide situation updated to WHO and international agencies and other governments  | Ministry of Health, Ministry of Foreign Affairs | Regular liaison with WHO and other countries  |
| Review usage of national reserve of essential supplies and consider re-ordering supplies.  | Ministry of Health; EOC planning work stream    | Essential item usage reviewed and stock re-ordered as required for a national contingency stock |
| Return to standby activities when recovery is complete.  | Ministry of Health                              | Activities of Standby phase initiated   |
| Review usage of national reserve of essential supplies and consider re-ordering supplies.  | Ministry of Health; EOC planning work stream    | Essential item usage reviewed and stock re-ordered as required for a national contingency stock |



| Action  | Responsible agencies                                  | Target   |
|---|---|--|
| Review surveillance activities and maintain those required during the transition to full recovery   | Health Protection Agency                              | Surveillance activities reviewed and epidemiological indicators monitored weekly   |
| Update national risk assessment taking into consideration vaccine coverage, with subnational disaggregation and provide recommendations to HECC | Health Protection Agency; EOC surveillance workstream | Risk assessment presented to<br>HEOC within 24 hours of criteria<br>met for lifting public health<br>emergency at national level |
| Prepare situation reports and epidemiological summaries   | Health Protection Agency                              | Weekly and monthly epidemiological analysis produced and updates made available  |
| Report suspected cases at health care facilities  | Health care providers                                 | Suspected cases from health facilities reported daily  |
| Monitor situation through with disease notification and laboratory surveillance.  | Health Protection Agency                              | Disease notifications monitored and case investigation conducted   |
| Monitor vaccination coverage and its effects on disease control   | Health Protection Agency; EOC surveillance workstream | Vaccination coverage monitored   |
| Return to standby activities when recovery is complete.   | Health Protection Agency                              | Activities of Standby phase initiated  |



| Action  | Responsible agencies                       | Target  |  |
|---|--|---|--|
| Scale down border health response activities in a phased manner | All agencies involved in border management | Border activities scales down   |  |
| Update health requirements for travelers to and from Maldives   | Health Protection Agency                   | Traveler health requirements updated and shared with all agencies at border |  |
| Return to standby activities when recovery is complete.         | Health Protection Agency                   | Activities of Standby phase initiated                                       |  |



## Function Preparedness and control interventions

| Action   | Responsible agencies                   | Target  |
|--|--|---|
| Implement a phased stand-down of response activities including decommissioning or recommissioning of isolation and quarantine facilities, temporary hospital setups. | Ministry of Health; EOC<br>workstreams | Response activities discontinued and facilities de or re commissioned   |
| Start implementing priority recovery activities  | All sectors                            | Priority recovery activities initiated                                  |
| Resume business-as-usual services gradually.   | All sectors                            | Return to business initiated  |
| Organize debriefings and review lessons learnt.  | All sectors                            | Debriefings shared and documented                                       |
| Review and update pandemic preparedness and response plan and sectoral plans accordingly.  | Ministry of Health; all sectors        | Pandemic preparedness and response plan updated; sectoral plans updated |
| Return to standby activities when recovery is complete.  | Health Protection Agency               | Activities of Standby phase initiated                                   |




# Function Communications and awareness

| Action  | Responsible agencies  | Target  |
|---|---|---|
| Update the public and all sectors on any changes to the status of the pandemic.   | Ministry of Health, with the support of other agencies              | Public informed of changes to the situation   |
| Start implementing priority recovery activities   | Ministry of Health; EOC communications work stream                  | Information on recovery provided to public  |
| Ministry of Health; EOC communications work stream  | Ministry of Health; EOC communications work stream                  | Situation and response summaries updated weekly and published on pandemic website   |
| Update pandemic dashboard with Realtime data and updates  | Ministry of Health; EOC communications and surveillance workstreams | Dashboard containing statistics of disease and epidemiological parameters, testing, quarantine and isolation and (vaccination if available) updated daily |
| Initiate development of a behaviour change campaign for continued practice of prevention measures, post-trauma knowledge. | Ministry of Health; EOC communications work stream, media           | Behaviour change communication campaign launched with the start of lifting of public health measures  |
| Update messages on health requirements for travel to and from Maldives  | Ministry of Health; EOC communications work stream, media           | Updates messages on travel information available on immigration, tourism, foreign ministry and pandemic websites  |
| Initiate institutionalization of comms operations at Health Protection Agency with human and material resources           | Ministry of Health; EOC communications work stream, media           | Institutionalization arrangements made to transition to HPA   |



| Action   | Responsible agencies                            | Target  |
|--|---|---|
| Implement a phased stand-down of response activities.  | All EOC workstreams                             | EOC deactivated   |
| Handover materials mobilized from other agencies for the operations                                    | Ministry of Health; All EOC workstreams         | Materials handed over to respective agencies and records updated          |
| Institutionalize core preparedness functions at Ministry of Health                                     | Ministry of Health                              | Emergency management Standby donations transitioned to Ministry of Health |
| Transition Outbreak system to Health<br>Protection Agency with onsite trouble<br>shooting arrangements | Ministry of Health; Health<br>Protection Agency | Outbreak system transitioned to HPA                                       |
| Maintain contact list of other agencies for national, intersectoral and atoll coordination.            | Ministry of Health                              | Contain list of agency focal points maintained up-to-date                 |
| Prepare repose operations report   |   | Response operations report published                                      |
| Return to standby activities when recovery is complete.  | Health Protection Agency                        | Activities of Standby phase initiated                                     |



## Contact persons for pandemic response in the health sector



#### International Health Regulations (IHR) focal point

► Director General of Public Health, Health Protection Agency



#### Planning, coordination and reporting

- ► Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Health
- Head, Planning and international coordination, Ministry of Health
   Head, Health information and research, Ministry of Health
- ► Focal point for health emergencies, Health Protection Agency



#### Surveillance and situational analysis

- Head, Communicable disease control, Health Protection Agency
- ► Head, Surveillance, Health Protection Agency



#### **Border Management**

► Head, Border health, Health Protection Agency



#### **Health Interventions**

- Director General of Health Services, Ministry of Health Quality Commissioner, Ministry of Health
- Head, National referral hospital Head, National reference laboratory
- ► Head, Atoll health services coordination Deputy Head, Health Protection Agency
- Head, Health promotion and public awareness, Health Protection Agency





#### **EOC** management

- Deputy Director General, Health Protection Agency Head, Administration,
   Ministry of Health
- ► Head, Finance, Ministry of Health
- ► Head, Human resources, Ministry of Health
- ► Head, central medical supplies, Ministry of Health

# Workflow in responding to a suspected case: COVID-19 pandemic EOC

#### **COVID-19 EOC PROCESS 1**





## Forms and Templates: COVID-19 response

This section provides forms and templates used in the COVID19 pandemic response.

Impact based planning tool in pandemic management

| Comprehensive values for civil protection and emergency preparedness:  | Risk Leve | el Indicators   |
|--|-----------|---|
| 1. Human life and health  The protection value includes the physical and psychological health of those affected directly or indirectly by the pandemic. The people include Maldivian citizens, migrant residents in Maldives, or who are here temporarily and the Maldives nationals residing abroad.                | High      | <ul> <li>1.1 Number of fatalities from covid19 and non covid19</li> <li>1.2 Number of people requiring hospitalised care</li> <li>1.3 Number of people needing psychological support</li> </ul>   |
| 2. Society's functionality Society's functionality covers the functionality and continuity of that which strongly impacts on the daily lives of individuals, companies and other organizations. This also includes the expertise of staff in maintaining the functionality of society.                               | High      | <ul> <li>2.1 Disruptions to everyday life</li> <li>2.2 Lack of fulfilment of basic needs</li> <li>2.3 Number of people who need to be evacuated</li> <li>2.4 Number of people estranged from family-bases carers</li> <li>2.5 Number of people at needing protection from domestic violence</li> </ul>              |
| 3. Democracy, rule of law and human rights and freedoms  Society's functionality covers the functionality and continuity of that which strongly impacts on the daily lives of individuals, companies and other organizations. This also includes the expertise of staff in maintaining the functionality of society. | Moderate  | <ul> <li>3.1 Social unrest resulting in negative behavioural changes</li> <li>3.2 Lack of confidence in public institutions</li> <li>3.3 Serious impact on national political decisions</li> <li>3.4 Lack of control over public institutions</li> <li>3.5 Impact on Maldives reputation internationally</li> </ul> |
| 4. Economic assets  Society's functionality covers the functionality and continuity of that which strongly impacts on the daily lives of individuals, companies and other organizations. This also includes the expertise of staff in maintaining the functionality of society.                                      | High      | 4.1 Total economic impacts  |
| 5. National sovereignty  Control over the nation's territory. This protection value applies primarily if the cause of the event is antagonistic.   |           | 5.1 Lack of control over territory  |
| 6. Environment Environment described as land, water and natural environment, biodiversity, valuable natural and cultural environment.  | Moderate  | <ul><li>6.1 Impacts on physical environment<br/>(waste management)</li><li>6.2 Impacts on cultural environment<br/>(traditions-burial, prayers)</li></ul>   |



Version 3: Updated 14th August 2020

### Case Investigation and Contact Tracing Questionnaire – COVID-19 Positive Cases

| Outbreak Case ID: CA-2020-   |  | HPA C        | ase No:                      | MAV             | 1        | Reporting Date: -/-/ 2020         |
|--|--|--------------|------------------------------|-----------------|----------|-----------------------------------|
| Links to Other Positive Cases:<br>(previous positives from same house, sam                         | e office, if a contac  | t of another | case etc.)                   |                 |          | TraceEkee app user?  Yes No       |
| Name:  |  |              |                              |                 | PP/N     | ID No:                            |
| Nationality:   | D.O.B  Currer  Asymptomatic sappropriate  Breathing difficulties  Sneezing  Watery eyes  Others, specify   |              |                              | Age             |          | Gender:                           |
| Contact No.  |  | Current      | Address                      | S:              |          | <u>'</u>                          |
| Permanent Address:   |  |              |                              |                 | Occu     | pation:                           |
| Employer/Company Name:   |  |              |                              |                 |          |                                   |
| Date last reported to work:  |  |              |                              |                 |          |                                   |
| Supervisor Name:   |  |              |                              | Supervisor Co   | ntact N  | No:                               |
| ☐ Symptomatic ☐  | THE RESIDENCE OF THE PARTY OF T |              | Dateo                        | f symptoms ons  | et:      |                                   |
| Symptoms (if any): Tick (✓) as   | appropriate  |              |                              |                 |          |                                   |
| ☐ Shortness of breath ☐  | ] Breathing d  | ifficulties  |                              | Fever           |          | ☐ Headache                        |
| ☐ Common cold ☐  | Sneezing   |              |                              | Sore throat     |          | ☐ Dry cough                       |
| ☐ Runny nose ☐   | ] Watery eye   | s            |                              | Fatigue         |          | ☐ Aches and pains                 |
| ☐ Diarrhea ☐   | Others, spe  | cify         |                              |                 |          |                                   |
| Tracing period:<br>(if symptomatic - 2 days before date of<br>If asymptomatic - 2 days before date |  | tion)        | Did the period               |                 | lt a doo | ctor within tracing               |
| Date of consultation:  |  |              | Healthcare Facility visited: |                 |          |                                   |
| took any IPC measures etc.)  | tal visit: (Spec   | ify means    | s of transp                  |                 | - Mi     | d by a bystander, whether patient |
| Place of sampling:<br>(Eg: RRT Male', Atoll RRT, Senehiya, Id                                      | GMH etc.)  |              |                              | Date of s       | amplin   | g:                                |
| Reason for sample collection:  | (Active surveille  | ance, Ran    | dom sam                      | pling, Symptoma | ıtic sam | ple, Release sample etc.)         |
| Comorbidities/Underlying of  | onditions if   | any: Tic     | k (√) as                     | appropriate     |          |                                   |
| ☐ Hypertension   |  | Diabete      | s Mellitu                    | s               |          | Lung disease                      |
| ☐ Heart disease  |  | Thalass      |                              |                 |          | Cancer                            |
| ☐ Pregnancy ( mo   | nths)  | Liver di     | sease                        |                 |          | Others, specify                   |
| No. of people living together:   | No. of   | rooms:       | -                            | No. of toilets: |          | No. of floors in building:        |

|   |  | Details of              | living situation                        |                   |                                    |  |  |  |
|---|--|-------------------------|---|-------------------|------------------------------------|--|--|--|
|   | Living with family   | ☐ Shared r              | oom                                     |                   | Rented room                        |  |  |  |
|   | Guesthouse   | ☐ Hostel                |   |                   | Staffaccommodation                 |  |  |  |
|   | Others, specify:   |                         |   | is and the second |                                    |  |  |  |
| No. of  | people sharing same room with po   | sitive case:            | Any high-risk group pe                  | rson(s) li        | ving with positive case:           |  |  |  |
|   | Details of dependents (Provide details below, along with details of alternate arrangements for childcare (if applicable)): |                         |   |                   |                                    |  |  |  |
|   | No. of contacts in the house with symptoms: (List details)   |                         |   |                   |                                    |  |  |  |
|   | rs to house during the tracing period  | d? (Friends, , housemo  | ites, which shops they receiv           | ed delive         | ry of food/supplies from etc.)     |  |  |  |
|   | Family members   |                         |   |                   |                                    |  |  |  |
|   | Friends  |                         |   |                   |                                    |  |  |  |
|   | □ Work Colleagues  |                         |   |                   |                                    |  |  |  |
|   | Relatives  |                         |   |                   |                                    |  |  |  |
|   | Housemates   |                         |   |                   |                                    |  |  |  |
|   | Food delivery  |                         |   |                   |                                    |  |  |  |
|   | Delivery of supplies from shops  |                         |   |                   |                                    |  |  |  |
|   | Others, specify:   |                         |   |                   |                                    |  |  |  |
| Place   | visited in the Tracing period: (De   | tails of places visited | such as shops, cafes, houses            | office s          | chool etc. Specify dates, times of |  |  |  |
|   | eople who came into contact with patie   |                         | ,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,, | , -,, -,          | ,                                  |  |  |  |
|   | Mosque $\Box$  | Café'/Restaurant        |   | Gym               |                                    |  |  |  |
|   | Workplace □  | Shop                    |   | School            |                                    |  |  |  |
|   | Saloon/Spa □   | Park                    |   | Others            | , specify:                         |  |  |  |
| For case investigation purpose Places visited in the past 14 days (If it does not fall within the tracing period) |  |                         |   |                   |                                    |  |  |  |
| Emerg   | gency Contact Name:  | Emergency Co            | ontact No.                              | Relati            | onship to Patient:                 |  |  |  |
|   | Completed By:  |                         |   |                   |                                    |  |  |  |
| Name<br>Date:   | 2  |                         | Signature:                              |                   |                                    |  |  |  |
| Date:   |  |                         | Signature.                              |                   |                                    |  |  |  |

### Contact tracing form

| - |   |
|---|---|
|   | Jordani Julia<br>Health 20032<br>Protection<br>Agency |

### **CONTACT TRACING**

| Revised | on: | 13 | Aug | 2020 |
|---------|-----|----|-----|------|
|         |     |    |     |      |

|        | rimajith  |                    |  |   |                   |                         |                    |                      |  |
|--------|---|--------------------|--|---|-------------------|-------------------------|--------------------|----------------------|--|
|        | Heaville<br>Protection<br>Agentics                        | 1                  | -  |   |                   |                         |                    | 1                    | Contact in Male'   |
| CA-2   | 020-  | со                 | VID-19 F                                     | Related C   | Contact T         | racing I                | orm                | ı                    | Contact in Atoll   |
|        | Fill and Tick (✓) as a                                    | ppropria           | ite  |   |                   |                         | Date of trac       | ing:                 |  |
|        | ink (reference number): (e<br>ow risk contact of case 21) | g.: Is a close     | e contact/low r                              | isk contact of A  | dr XY who iii a c | lose                    | Date of last       | t contact            | •  |
| Name   |   |                    |  |   | Age:              | Sex:                    | Relationship       | p to conta           | act:   |
| PP/ID  | No:   |                    | Date of                                      | of Birth:   |                   |                         | Contact nun        | nber:                |  |
| Nation | nality:   | Curre              | nt Resider                                   | ntial Addre   | ss/Location       | n:                      |                    |                      |  |
| Occup  | eation:   |                    |  | No. pp  | l living tog      | ether:                  | No. of room        | ns: N                | lo. of toilets:  |
| Locat  | ion where contact took p                                  | lace:              |  |   |                   |                         |                    |                      |  |
| Public | places visited in past 2                                  | days (48           | hours)                                       |   |                   | J                       |                    |                      |  |
|        | Mosque  |                    | Café'/Re                                     | estaurant   |                   |                         | Gym                |                      | Workplace  |
|        | Shop  |                    | School                                       |   |                   |                         | Saloon/Spa         |                      | Park   |
| Emer   | gency contact Name/Nur                                    | nber/Re            | lationship                                   | :   |                   |                         |                    |                      |  |
| Type   | of Contact:   | Close              | contact (H                                   | ligh, Medi  | um)               |                         | ☐ Lo               | w risk c             | ontact   |
| Close  | Contact: Tick (✓) mark :                                  |                    |  |   |                   |                         |                    |                      |  |
|        | Having face-to-face co                                    | ntact wit          | h a COVII                                    | D-19 positi   | ve/suspecte       | ed case w               | ithin 3 feet for > | 15 minute            | es   |
|        | Person providing direct                                   |                    |  | 9 positive/   | suspected         | case (wit               | hout using proper  | persona              | l protective   |
|        | Living in the same hou                                    |                    |  | d-like setti  | ng (shared        | section o               | of households, bar | racks, do            | omes etc) with a   |
|        | positive case   | 00.000.000.000.000 | N. R. S. | 310.0 T. 10.0 |                   | 10.37.27.27.27.29.27.77 |                    | 1000 Process #11,000 | orania de la carra de la c |
|        | Staying in the same clo<br>classroom or household         |                    |  |   |                   |                         |                    | ıg sharing           | g a workplace,   |
|        | Staying in the same clo<br>aircraft within 6 feet ar      |                    |  |   | -19 positiv       | e case (i               | neluding sharing a | a transpo            | rt vehicle other than  |
|        | Healthcare worker* wi<br>appropriate personal pr          |                    |  |   |                   |                         |                    | ous perio            | od, without  |
|        | Presence in a same roo                                    |                    |  |   |                   |                         |                    | undertak             | ren on a positive case   |
|        | without PPE (including                                    |                    |  | etting wife   | n an acrosc       | r genera                | ting procedure is  | turcior tax          | en on a positive case  |
|        | Direct contact with boo                                   | ly fluids          | or laborate                                  | ory specimo   | ens of a pos      | sitive/sus              | spected case       |                      |  |
|        | Having been seated on                                     | aircraft c         | loser than                                   | 2 seats in  | any direction     | on as a C               | OVID-19 positiv    | e case               |  |
|        | Travel from a country,                                    | Island or          | area with                                    | uncontain   | ed commur         | ity trans               | mission in last 14 | days                 |  |
| Lowr   | isk contact: Tick (✓) ma                                  | rk as ann          | ropriate                                     |   |                   |                         |                    |                      |  |
|        | Any exposure that does i                                  |                    | San      | ntacts  |                   |                         |                    |                      |  |
|        | elated additional note:                                   |                    |  |   |                   |                         |                    |                      |  |
|        | Symptomatic   |                    |  |   |                   |                         | ☐ Asv              | mptom                | atic   |
|        | ptomatic, Tick (✓) mar                                    | k as appi          | ropriate                                     |   |                   | Da                      | te of onset of syn |                      |  |
|        | Shortness of breath                                       |                    |  | g difficulti  | ies 🗆             | Feve                    | r                  |                      | Headache   |
|        | Common cold   |                    | Sneezing                                     | 3   |                   | Sore                    | throat             |                      | Dry cough  |
|        | Runny nose  |                    | Watery o                                     | eyes  |                   | Fatig                   | ue                 |                      | Aches and pains  |
|        | Diarrhea  |                    |  | ve cough  |                   | Othe                    | rs, specify        | 117                  | 12.  |
|        | Inderlying conditions if a                                | iny: Ticl          | k (✓) mar                                    | k as appro  | priate            |                         |                    |                      |  |
|        | Hypertension  |                    |  | Diabetes 1  | Mellitus          |                         | Lung disease       |                      |  |
|        | Heart disease   |                    |  | Thalassen   | nia               |                         | Cancer             |                      |  |

Liver disease

Others, specify: .....

Pregnancy (----- months)



|       |                                   | Decisions m        | ade: Tick (     | √) mark as appr   | opriate            |                          |
|-------|-----------------------------------|--------------------|-----------------|-------------------|--------------------|--------------------------|
|       | Symptomatic sample                | ☐ High-r           | isk sample      | ☐ Hor             | ne Quarantine /    | Home Isolation (contact) |
|       | Island monitoring                 | ☐ House            | Monitoring      | ng                | ☐ Care             |                          |
|       | Facility quarantine/ isola        | tion (contact)     |                 | essel monitoring  | □ E                | xtend house monitoring   |
| Nam   | e of Facility (if in a facility): |                    |                 | Isolation         | ☐ Quara            | antine                   |
| Date  | of sample collection:             |                    | Sample F        | Results:          | ☐ Positive         | ☐ Negative               |
| Start | date of quarantine/Isolation:     |                    |                 | End date of qua   | arantine/isolation | E                        |
| Pleas | se list the details of the depend | dent (to share roo | m at facility): |                   |                    |                          |
| Com   | ments:                            |                    |                 |                   |                    |                          |
|       |                                   |                    |                 |                   |                    |                          |
| Ente  | red by:                           |                    | *               | *Verified by:     |                    |                          |
| Note  |                                   |                    |                 |                   |                    |                          |
|       | e Contact+ Symptomatic =          |                    |                 |                   |                    |                          |
| Clos  | e Contact+ Asymptomatic           | = House month      | oring + Hon     | ie Quarantine + 1 | vo sampung         |                          |
| Higi  | n Risk Group Contact+ Asy         | mptomatic= H       | ouse monitor    | ring +Home Quar   | antine+ Sampli     | ing                      |
| Low   | risk contact + Asymptoma          | tic = No sampl     | ing             |                   |                    |                          |
| Low   | risk contact + Symptomat          |                    |                 |                   |                    |                          |
|       | h risk group+ Secondary co        | antant - Commi     | 200             |                   |                    |                          |

\*Healthcare worker defined as all staff in the health care facility involved in the provision of care for a COVID-2019 infected patient (clinical and non-clinical contact with patient or contaminated surface or materials:

If a healthcare worker associated exposure occurs to a confirmed case without appropriate PPE, the HCW would be advised for home quarantine even if asymptomatic and TAG team to be informed immediately.

- \*\* Person signing for verified by to double check Decisions made aligns with the rest of information entered into the sheet.
- \*\*\* For contacts with any underlying conditions MMRT team should also be notified.

\*\*\*\*For any high-risk /vulnerable person(s) trigger to Carebee/Haalubelun

Page2

Roashanee Building (4<sup>th</sup> floor) Sosun Magu, Male', Republic of Maldives Tel: +960 3014494 Email: hpa@health.gov.mv Fax: +960 3014484

Website: www.hpa.gov.mv

Version 1: 1 Sept 2020





| Name:   |  | HPA case no: MAV   | _  |
|---------|--|--|----|
| ID/PP   | No:                                      | Contact number:  | _  |
| Addres  | s:                                       |  | _  |
| Care ta | aker/Guardian name:                      |  | _  |
| Contac  | t number:                                |  | _  |
|         |  | בר העל על בני הלי לים לים לים לים לים לים לים לים לים ל  | 3  |
|         |  |  | .1 |
|         |  | שלפיל ו בנ פתמית נות פתחים שיונגם על בינה מה   | -2 |
|         |  | مُنْذِرُونُ مِنْ وَمِ تَغْمِيمُهُ وُرُمْ مُدُنَّ مُعْرِدِ  | .3 |
|         | مر در شرش                                | مُعَالِمِعْمُورُو مُرِهُمِيمُمْمَ مُوَمِّدُ 60 مُرَكِيْرُ وَمِوْ وِرَدُ مُوَمَّ رَمِيمَ  | .4 |
|         |  | و مدر مرسود مومود الله الله الله الله الله الله الله الل   | .5 |
|         |  | בינישלה הנים מנכים בחל נכל יינ ל   |    |
|         | 3  | 24 44 124 011 44 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4   | -6 |
|         |  | دُورِ دُوَرُرِوْوُوْوُ سَوْدُوْ وُرِدَوَوْمِ دُوَرُونُوْدُوْ دُوَرِوْدُوْ مَرْدُهُ مَرْدُهُ مَرْدُهُ<br>رِدْشُ صَبِهُوْدُورِمُرُوْدُ وُرْدُ ( ☑) خَرُورِهُرْدُوْدُ<br>وُدُ—اِوْ وَرِدُّ وِرُ صَدْرُونُوْدُوْدُ دُوارِدُوْدُ وَرَدُّ وَرَدُ كَادُرِ سَامِعِ | -  |
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
| מו העל אינו העל אינו | د کرد د کار در کار کار کار کار کار کار کار کار کار کا |
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
### عَرْوَوْ 1: رَمِيرَ عُوْدُ وَرُيْرُ

- ﴿ وَوَدُورُومُ مِنْ مِنْ مُومِنِهُ وَمُوْ وَمُوْ الْمُوْ الْوُدِيرُ.
- ﴿ وَمُرْدُونَ وَمِوْنَ وَمُوْ الْمُورِدُ ﴿ وَمُوْ وَمُونَا فَوْمِدُ مِوْمِدُ وَمُعْدُومُومُ مُونَا وَمُوْ وَرُيْرُ فِي وِرْيْرُوْتُ رِوْسٌ)
- ﴿ رَدُمُونَ وَوْدٍ سِهُوْ وَوَسْرِوْرُورُ رُو مُدْ رَبِر وِرَبْرُ ( مُعْدَمْدِهِ، عُدُو فَيْ مُرْدِمُ وَوَرُدُومُ، مِرْدِهِ مِيْدُ مُولِمُ وَوَرْ عُدِهُ عُدُودِيْ دِرْسُ)
  - ﴿ رِمْدُ عَوِ رُسُرَةً وِرُسُرُ
  - ﴿ رُدُرُ مُو رُدُرُرُ وِرُدُرُ
  - ﴿ مُوْسِردُ دُوْمُ سِنْوُ سِنْوُ سُوْ مُسِردُ لَهِ وَلَمْ
    - ﴿ وُعَدْ وِرْثر
    - ﴿ وَوَيْرِهُ عَيْدُمُ رُبِرِ وِرْشِ
  - א וראשים בורמיבי בישבי בחבר מתובי ביתונה ביני



















09 Sept 2020





#### COVID-19 SURVEILLANCE IN ATOLLS

#### Rationale

Since the first case of COVID-19 was seen in Maldives, several measures have been taken at national level to reduce the possibility of community spread of the disease. Anationwide lockdown was announced from 15 April 2020 onwards as a response aimed at slowing the spread of the coronavirus disease. But with the ease of lock down, cases increase markedly in Male' area since Mid-July and the epidemic continues to spread, yet localized to this geographic area.

To contain the spread of COVID-19 to the Atolls, mandatory quarantine is enforced for all persons travelling to the Atolls (except for very short essential service support). A number of people became positive at the time of quarantine release in the Atolls. Furthermore, there is an increase in the ARI and viral fever reported in routing surveillance. Hence, in order to understand the spread of COVID-19 in the Atolls, it is important to carry out active surveillance.

#### Methods

Active surveillance is planned, to check for evidence of further community transmission of COVID-19. This will be done to detect community transmission, and to check for current spread among potential exposed people, vulnerable and caretaker or visiting caretaker of a vulnerable. Active surveillance among selected high-risk groups will be carried out as follows to check for current spread of the disease in the community. Selected samples will be taken from potential cases and those with high exposure and will be tested by RT-PCR for COVID-19.

#### Categories of people to be sampled for COVID-19 surveillance

#### 1- At health facility/flu clinic

- a. All SARI cases at health facility
- b. Influenza like illnesses (ILI) and ARI presenting to flu clinic/OPD
  - i. All cases who are 60+ who have symptoms of ILI/ARI
  - ii. All cases with chronic diseases (cardiovascular diseases including heart disease and stroke, diabetes, lung disease, kidney disease, liver disease ,on treatment for cancer, has a disease or taking medications which causes

گرشته بر چون برو (4 کانتر کرشو برقر)، سیستند کرتی، گرفو، مرفورشده فی 1960 3014484: pgov.mv: برفرده hpa@health.gov.mv: وثانت به 4960 3014494 کوشتریک www.hpa.gov.mv: immunosuppression, pregnancy, Thalassaemia Major) who have symptoms of ILI/ARI

- iii. All cases who has new onset of anosmia or ageusia (loss of smell or taste)
- iv. Every 5<sup>th</sup> case who have symptoms of ILI/ARI (if daily consultations less than 5, all cases with ILI/ARI symptoms)

#### 2- In islands with any active cases, surveillance to be done by doing random sampling

(to start from 10 September 2020 and repeat every 3 weeks):

- a. Workers at restaurant/café (minimum 3 or 10%)
- b. Workers at shops (minimum 3 or 10%)
- c. Workers on boats/ferries (minimum 3 or 10%)
- d. Airport workers where airport exists (15% of workers)- including domestic airline/seaplane crew
- e. People attending mosque (minimum 3 or 10%)
- f. People working in industrial islands (10%)

#### DEFINITONS

#### SARI case definition

An acute respiratory infection with:

- history of fever or measured fever of ≥ 38 C°;
- and cough;
- · with onset within the last 10 days;
- and requires hospitalization.

#### ILI case definition

An acute respiratory infection with:

- measured fever of ≥ 38 C°
- and cough;
- · with onset within the last 10 days.

Acute respiratory illness (ARI): Sudden onset of respiratory infection symptoms (cough, sore throat shortness of breath, runny nose)

Active case: A confirmed case is a person with laboratory confirmation of infection with the COVID-19 virus,irrespective of clinical signs and symptoms

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#### COVID-19 SURVEILLANCE IN GREATER MALE' AREA

#### Rationale

Since the first case of COVID-19 was seen in Maldives, several measures have been taken at national level to reduce the possibility of community spread of the disease. A nationwide lockdown was announced from 15 April 2020 onwards as a response aimed at slowing the spread of the coronavirus disease. But with the ease of lock down, cases increase markedly in Male' area since Mid-July and the epidemic continues to spread in Male' are and is showing signs of stabilizing. To monitor the epidemiological situation in the coming months and detect any changes to the disease transmission situation, surveillance will be continued at flu clinics, and actively in the community.

#### Methods

Samples will be taken from potential cases at flu clinics and those occupational groups with high exposure and will be tested by RT-PCR for COVID-19.

#### Categories of people to be sampled for COVID-19 surveillance

1- ACTIVE SURVEILLANCE - to start from 10 September 2020 and continued for at least one month

Active surveillance will target the following groups. Daily samples to be collected is calculated based on estimates of people in these areas made during June 2020, with a target to sample 500-650 people per day. Daily samples should not be less than 400.

All areas of greater Male' area should be covered over a week [(ViliMale' (10%), HulhuMale' (30%), Male' (50%) and Thilafushi (10%)]

| Category   | Daily samples |
|--|---------------|
| Workers at restaurant/café/shops   | 100 - 150     |
| Workers on boats/ferries/taxi/bus drivers  | 70 - 80       |
| People attending mosques   | 40 - 50       |
| People at public spaces – parks, beaches, swimming track, bus stop   | 40 - 50       |
| Workers at markets/ baazaaru /fish market  | 40 - 50       |
| Workers at Male'/ Hulhumale' industrial zone and Thilafushi  | 40 - 50       |
| Workers at airport   | 30 - 40       |
| Workers at sea port  | 30 - 40       |
| Workers at public services serving large number of customers (banks, petrol sheds, utility customer service areas) | 30 - 40       |
| Workers and residents at state care institutions — children's homes, old-age homes, rehabs, prisons                | 30 - 40       |
| Uniformed forces (MNDF, MPS)   | 30 - 40       |
| Healthcare workers   | 30 - 40       |

#### 2- SENTINEL SURVEILLANCE AT HEALTH FACILITES AND FLU CLINICS

- a. All SARI cases
- b. Influenza like illnesses (ILI) and ARI presenting to flu clinic/OPD
- c. All cases who are 60+ who have symptoms of ILI/ARI
- d. All cases with chronic diseases (cardiovascular diseases including heart disease and stroke, diabetes, lung disease, kidney disease, liver disease, on treatment for cancer, has a disease or taking medications which causes immunosuppression, pregnancy, Thalassaemia Major) who have symptoms of ILI/ARI
- e. Every case who have symptoms of ILI/ARI

#### DEFINITIONS

#### SARI case definition

An acute respiratory infection with:

- history of fever or measured fever of ≥ 38 C°;
- · and cough;
- · with onset within the last 10 days;
- · and requires hospitalization.

#### ILI case definition


An acute respiratory infection with:

- measured fever of ≥ 38 C°
- · and cough;
- · with onset within the last 10 days.


Acute respiratory illness (ARI): Sudden onset of respiratory infection symptoms (cough, sore throat shortness of breath, runny nose)

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
### Confirmed case movement protocol



#### Clinical risk triage protocol




### Recovery assessment of home isolated cases



#### NOTE: FOR HOSPITAL BASED ISOLATION,

De-Isolate 21 days after symptom onset PLUS atleast 3 days without symptoms (without fever and respiratory symptoms)

Confirmed positive immunocompromised patient (whether symptomatic or asymptomatic) require negative COVID-19 PCR even if above criteria is met



## Isolation release document template





#### HOME ISOLATION

#### RELEASE SUMMARY

| NAME:   |  | AGE:                     | GENDER:   |  |
|---|--|--------------------------|---|--|
| NID/PP Number:                                    | HPA case no: MAV_                        |                          | MOBILE NO:  |  |
| Sample taken Date:                                |  | SARS CoV2 Positive Date: |   |  |
| Date of symptoms:                                 | Current Address:                         |                          |   |  |
| DATE OF ISOLATION:                                |  | DATE OF RECOVERY:        |   |  |
|   |  |                          |   |  |
| CONDITION ON DISCH<br>allergies, Pre-existing con | ARGE (rule out if any Fever<br>ditions): | r, Sore throat, Run      | ny nose, Cough, Difficulty breathing, Known                               |  |
| CONDITION ON DISCH<br>allergies, Pre-existing con | ARGE (rule out if any Fever<br>ditions): | • Prac                   |   |  |
| allergies, Pre-existing con                       | ARGE (rule out if any Fever<br>ditions): | • Prac<br>• Mai<br>• Avo | etice IPC measures (hand hygiene, wear mask)<br>ntain Physical distancing |  |

DAYS WITHOUT SYMPTOMS AFTER ASSESSMENT BY DOCTOR

## Criteria for lifting quarantine of an island under and monitoring





31 October 2020

#### Criteria For Lifting Under Monitoring (Quarantine) status of Island

#### 1. Introduction

The purpose of placing islands under monitoring (quarantine) is to conduct epidemiological assessment, conduct contact tracing and isolate close contacts and suspected cases to reduce the risk of transmission of COVID-19 among people. In such situation movements to and from the islands are restricted.

Islands will be placed under monitoring (quarantine) when there is a confirmed case of COVID-19 detected through healthcare system and surveillance mechanisms. This does not include detection at the time of release of a person at the end of quarantine period. The purpose of the document is to provide epidemiological criteria for lifting under monitoring status (quarantine) of an Island.

#### 2.Scope

Lifting under Monitoring status of the island

#### 3. Criteria for lifting quarantine (monitoring) of Island

Quarantine (monitoring) of the island will be lifted based on the epidemiological situation where the following required criteria are met respectively:

- 3.1 Sporadic case: Contact tracing of positive case completed, and contacts isolated.
- 3.2 Local transmission with cluster of cases: Must meet all the criteria below
- a. Tracing completed and all contacts isolated AND
- b. All contacts PCR tested for COVID19 at the time of isolation AND
- c. On Day 1 Active surveillance of 1% of population conducted, PCR tested for COVID19, and all tested negative AND
- d. On Day 7 Active surveillance of 1% of population conducted, PCR tested for COVID19 and all tested negative AND
- e. Flu clinic sample positivity PCR test for COVID19 is less than 1% for 7 consecutive days.

We acknowledge that the support of all stakeholders in the country and non-resident partners producing this document.

